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As self-interested individuals (”agents”) make decisions over time, they utilize information revealed by other
agents in the past, and produce information that may help agents in the future. This phenomenon is common
in a wide range of scenarios in the Internet economy, as well as in medical decisions. Each agent would
like to exploit : select the best action given the current information, but would prefer the previous agents
to explore: try out various alternatives to collect information. A social planner, by means of a carefully
designed recommendation policy, can incentivize the agents to balance the exploration and exploitation so
as to maximize social welfare.
We model the planner’s recommendation policy as a multi-arm bandit algorithm under incentive-
compatibility constraints induced by agents’ Bayesian priors. We design a bandit algorithm which is incentive-
compatible and has asymptotically optimal performance, as expressed by regret. Further, we provide a
black-box reduction from an arbitrary multi-arm bandit algorithm to an incentive-compatible one, with
only a constant multiplicative increase in regret. This reduction works for very general bandit setting that
incorporate contexts and arbitrary partial feedback.
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† An extended abstract of this paper has been published in ACM EC 2015 (16th ACM Conf. on Economics and
Computation). Compared to the version in conference proceedings, this version contains complete proofs, revamped
introductory sections, and thoroughly revised presentation of the technical material. Further, two major extensions
are fleshed out, resp. to more than two actions and to more general machine learning settings, whereas they were only
informally described in the conference version. The main results are unchanged, but their formulation and presentation
is streamlined, particularly regarding assumptions on the common prior. This version also adds a discussion of
potential applications to medical trials.
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31. Introduction
Decisions made by an individual often reveal information about the world that can be useful to
others. For example, the decision to dine in a particular restaurant may reveal some observations
about this restaurant. This revelation could be achieved, for example, by posting a photo, tweet-
ing, or writing a review. Others can consume this information either directly (via photo, review,
tweet, etc.) or indirectly through aggregations, summarizations or recommendations. Thus, indi-
viduals have a dual role: they both consume information from previous individuals and produce
information for future consumption. This phenomenon applies very broadly: the choice of a prod-
uct or experience, be it a movie, hotel, book, home appliance, or virtually any other consumer’s
choice, leads to an individual’s subjective observations pertaining to this choice. These subjective
observations can be recorded and collected, e.g., when the individual ranks a product or leaves a
review, and can help others make similar choices in similar circumstances in a more informed way.
Collecting, aggregating and presenting such observations is a crucial value proposition of numerous
businesses in the modern Internet economy, such as TripAdvisor, Yelp, Netflix, Amazon, Waze
and many others (see Table 1). Similar issues, albeit possibly with much higher stakes, arise in
medical decisions: selecting a doctor or a hospital, choosing a drug or a treatment, or deciding
whether to participate in a medical trial. First the individual can consult information from similar
individuals in the past, to the extent that such information is available, and later he can contribute
her experience as a review or as an outcome in a medical trial.
Watch this movie Netflix
Dine in this restaurant Yelp
Vacation in this resort TripAdvisor
Buy this product Amazon
Drive this route Waze
Do this exercise FitBit
See this doctor SuggestADoctor
Take this medicine medical trial
Table 1 Systems for recommendations and collecting feedback.
If a social planner were to direct the individuals in the information-revealing decisions discussed
above, she would have two conflicting goals: exploitation, choose the best alternative given the infor-
mation available so far, and exploration, trying out less known alternatives for the sake of gathering
more information, at the risk of worsening the individual experience. A social planner would like
to combine exploration and exploitation so as to maximize the social welfare, which results in the
exploration-exploitation tradeoff, a well-known subject in Machine Learning, Operation Research
and Economics.
However, when the decisions are made by individuals rather than enforced by the planner, we
have another problem dimension based on the individuals’ incentives. While the social planner
benefits from both exploration and exploitation, each individuals’ incentives are typically skewed in
favor of the latter. (In particular, many people prefer to benefit from exploration done by others.)
Therefore, the society as a whole may suffer from insufficient amount of exploration. In particular,
if a given alternative appears suboptimal given the information available so far, however sparse
and incomplete, then this alternative may remain unexplored – even though it may be the best.
The focus of this work is how to incentivize self-interested decision-makers to explore. We con-
sider a social planner who cannot control the decision-makers, but can communicate with them,
e.g., recommend an action and observe the outcome later on. Such a planner would typically be
implemented via a website, either one dedicated to recommendations and feedback collection (such
as Yelp or Waze), or one that actually provides the product or experience being recommended
(such as Netflix or Amazon). In medical applications, the planner would be either a website that
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rates/recommends doctors and collects reviews on their services (such as rateMDs.com or Sug-
gestADoctor.com), or an organization conducting a medical trial. We are primarily interested in
exploration that is efficient from the social planner’s perspective, i.e., exploration that optimizes
the social welfare.1
Following Kremer et al. [2014], we consider a basic scenario when the only incentive offered by
the social planner is the recommended experience itself (or rather, the individual’s belief about
the expected utility of this experience). In particular, the planner does not offer payments for
following the recommendation. On a technical level, we study a mechanism design problem with an
explore-exploit tradeoff and auxiliary incentive-compatibility constraints. Absent these constraints,
our problem reduces to multi-armed bandits (MAB) with stochastic rewards, the paradigmatic and
well-studied setting for exploration-exploitation tradeoffs, and various generalizations thereof. The
interaction between the planner and a single agent can be viewed as a version of the Bayesian
Persuasion game [Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011] in which the planner has more information due
to the feedback from the previous agents; in fact, this information asymmetry is crucial for ensuring
the desired incentives.
1.1. Our model and scope
We consider the following abstract framework, called incentive-compatible exploration. The social
planner is an algorithm that interacts with the self-interested decision-makers (henceforth, agents)
over time. In each round, an agent arrives, chooses one action among several alternatives, receives
a reward for the chosen action, and leaves forever. Before an agent makes her choice, the planner
sends a message to the agent which includes a recommended action. Everything that happens in a
given round is observed by the planner, but not by other agents. The agent has a Bayesian prior on
the reward distribution, and chooses an action that maximizes its Bayesian expected reward given
the algorithm’s message (breaking ties in favor of the recommended action). The agent’s prior is
known to the planner, either fully or partially. We require the planner’s algorithm to be Bayesian
incentive-compatible (henceforth, BIC ), in the sense that each agent’s Bayesian expected reward
is maximized by the recommended action. The basic goal is to design a BIC algorithm so as to
maximize social welfare, i.e., the cumulative reward of all agents.
The algorithm’s message to each agent is restricted to the recommended action (call such algo-
rithms message-restricted). Any BIC algorithm can be turned into a message-restricted BIC algo-
rithm which chooses the same actions, as long as the agents’ priors are exactly known to the
planner.2 Note that a message-restricted algorithm (BIC or not) is simply an MAB-like learning
algorithm for the same setting.
A paradigmatic example is the setting where the reward is an independent draw from a distri-
bution determined only by the chosen action. All agents share a common Bayesian prior on the
reward distribution; the prior is also known to the planner. No other information is received by
the algorithm or an agent (apart from the prior, the recommended action, and the reward for the
chosen action). We call this setting BIC bandit exploration. Absent the BIC constraint, it reduces
to the MAB problem with IID rewards and Bayesian priors. We also generalize this setting in
several directions, both in terms of the machine learning problem being solved by the planner’s
algorithm, and in terms of the mechanism design assumptions on the information structure.
We assume that each agent knows which round he is arriving in. This assumption is without
loss of generality, because an algorithm that is BIC under this assumption is also BIC for a more
general version in which each agent has a Bayesian belief about his round. (Also, the round can
simply be included in the planner’s message to this agent.)
1 In the context of Internet economy, the “planner” would be a for-profit company. Yet, the planner’s goal, for the
purposes of incentivinzing exploration, would typically be closely aligned with the social welfare.
2This is by “revelation principle”, as observed in Kremer et al. [2014] (see Remark 3.1 in the Preliminaries).
5Discussion. BIC exploration can be interpreted as a protection from the selection bias, when
the population that participates in the experiment differs from the target population, potentially
affecting the findings. More specifically, both action and the observed outcome may depend on
agents’ properties, e.g., the people who rate a particular niche movie are the people who chose to
see this movie, and therefore (this being a niche movie) are much more likely to enjoy it.
BIC exploration does not rely on “external” incentives such as monetary payments or discounts,
social status distinctions (e.g., leaderboards or merit badges for prolific feedback contributors), or
people’s affinity towards experimentation. Such approaches can themseleves cause some selection
bias. Indeed, paying patients for participation in a medical trial may be more appealing to poorer
patients; offering discounts for new services may attract customers who are more sensitive to such
discounts; and relying on people who like to explore for themselves would lead to a dataset that
represents this category of people rather than the general population. While all these approaches
are reasonable and in fact widely used (with well-developed statistical tools to mitigate the selection
bias), an alternative intrinsically less prone to selection bias is, in our opinion, worth investigating.
The “intrinsic” incentives offered by BIC exploration can be viewed as a guarantee of fairness
for the agents. Indeed, even though the planner imposes experimentation on the agents, the said
experimentation does not degrade expected utility of any one agent. This is simply because an
agent can always choose to ignore the planner’s recommendation and select an action with the
highest prior mean reward. This is particularly important for settings in which “external” incentives
described above do not fully substitute for low intrinsic utility of the chosen actions. For example,
a monetary payment does not fully substitute for an adverse outcome of a medical trial, and a
discounted meal at a restaurant does not fully substitute for a bad experience.
However, the BIC property is stronger than the fairness property discussed above. Indeed, fol-
lowing the recommendation should be compared not only to ignoring it (and going with the best
action according to the prior), but also to choosing some other action given the recommendation.
In other words, an agent may see a particular action being recommended, do a Bayesian update
on this fact, and decide to choose a different action; BIC property does not allow this to happen.
We focus on message-restricted algorithms, and rely on the BIC property to convince agents to
follow our recommendations. We do not attempt to make our recommendations more convincing
by revealing additional information, because doing so does not help in our model, and because
the desirable kinds of additional information to be revealed are likely to be application-specific
(whereas with message-restricted algorithms we capture many potential applications at once). Fur-
ther, message-restricted algorithms are allowed, and even recommended, in the domain of medical
trials (see Section 1.4 for discussion).
We make the standard assumptions of trust and rationality. We assume the “power of com-
mitment”: the planner can commit to a particular policy, and the agents trust that the planner
actually implements it. We posit that the agents are Bayesian and risk-neutral.3 Finally, we assume
that the agents either trust that our mechanisms are Bayesian incentive-compatible, or are able to
verify this property themselves or via third party. While non-trivial, such assumptions are standard
and tremendously useful in many scenarios throughout economics.
Objectives. We seek BIC algorithms whose performance is near-optimal for the corresponding
setting without the BIC constraint. This is a common viewpoint for welfare-optimizing mechanism
design problems, which often leads to strong positive results, both prior-independent and Bayesian,
even if Bayesian-optimal BIC algorithms are beyond one’s reach. Prior-independent guarantees are
particularly desirable because priors are almost never completely correct in practice.
We express prior-independent performance of an algorithm via a standard notion of regret : the
difference, in terms of the cumulative expected reward, between the algorithm and the the best fixed
action. Intuitively, it is the extent to which the algorithm “regrets” not knowing the best action
in advance. For Bayesian performance, we consider Bayesian regret : ex-post regret in expectation
3A version of risk-aversion may be modeled in a standard way, by redefining rewards for the undesirable outcomes.
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over the prior, and also the average Bayesian-expected reward per agent. (For clarity, we will refer
to the prior-independent version as ex-post regret.) Moreover, we consider a version in which the
algorithm outputs a prediction after each round (visible only to the planner), e.g., the predicted
best action; then we are interested in the rate at which this prediction improves over time.
1.2. Our contributions
On a high level, we make two contributions:
Regret minimization We provide an algorithm for BIC bandit exploration whose ex-post regret is
asymptotically optimal among all MAB algorithms (assuming a constant number of actions). Our
algorithm is detail-free, in that it requires only a limited knowledge of the prior.
Black-box reduction We provide a reduction from an arbitrary learning algorithm to a BIC one,
with only a minor loss in performance; this reduction “works” for a very general setting.
In what follows we discuss our results in more detail.
Regret minimization. Following the literature on regret minimization, we focus on the asymp-
totic ex-post regret rate as a function of the time horizon (which in our setting corresponds to
the number of agents). We establish that the BIC restriction does not affect the asymptotically
optimal ex-post regret rate. The optimality is two-fold: in the worst case over all realizations of
the common prior (i.e., for every possible vector of expected rewards), and for every particular
realization of the prior (which may allow much smaller ex-post regret than in the worst-case). More
formally, if T is the time horizon and ∆ is the “gap” in expected reward between the best action
and the second-best action, then our algorithm achieves ex-post regret
cP + c0 ·min(m∆ logT,
√
mT logT ), (1.1)
where c0 is an absolute constant, and cP < 0 depends only on the common prior P. Without
the BIC restriction, bandit algorithms achieve a similar regret bound, but without the cP term
[Auer et al. 2002a]. No bandit algorithm, BIC or not, can achieve ex-post regret better than
O(min(m
∆
logT,
√
mT )) [Lai and Robbins 1985, Auer et al. 2002b]. 4
Conceptually, our algorithm implements adaptive exploration: the exploration schedule is
adapted to the observations, so that low-performing actions are phased out early. This is known
to be a vastly superior approach compared to exploration schedules that are fixed in advance.5
Further, our algorithm is detail-free, requiring only a limited knowledge of the common prior.
This is desirable because in practice it may be complicated or impossible to elicit the prior exactly.
Moreover, this feature allows the agents to have different priors (as long as they are “compatible”
with the planner’s prior, in a precise sense specified later). In fact, an agent does not even need
to know her prior exactly: instead, she would trust the planner’s recommendation as long as she
believes that their priors are compatible.
The prior-dependent additive term cP in (1.1) can get arbitrarily large depending on the prior,
even for two arms. Informally, the magnitude of cP is proportional to how difficult it is to con-
vince an agent to try a seemingly suboptimal action. This term can also grow exponentially with
the number of arms m in some examples. While (very) suboptimal for multi-armed bandits, we
conjecture that such dependence is an inevitable “price of incentive-compatibility”.
Black-box reduction. Given an arbitrary MAB algorithm A, we provide a BIC algorithm AIC
which internally uses A as a “black-box”. That is, AIC simulates a run of A, providing inputs and
4More precisely, this is the best regret bound that can be achieved for all problem instances with gap ∆.
5 For multi-armed bandit algorithms with fixed exploration schedules, regret can be no better than Ω(m1/3 T 2/3)
in the worst case over all problem instances, and (essentially) no better than O(∆TΩ(1)) in the worst case over all
problem instances with gap ∆ [Babaioff et al. 2014].
7recording the respective outputs, but does not depend on the internal workings of A. In addition
to recommending an action, the original algorithm A can also output a prediction after each round
(visible only to the planner), e.g. the predicted best action; then AIC outputs a prediction, too.
A reduction such as ours allows a modular design: one can design a non-BIC algorithm (or take
an existing one), and then use the reduction to inject incentive-compatibility. Modular designs are
very desirable in complex economic systems, especially for settings such as MAB with a rich body
of existing work.
Our reduction incurs only a small loss in performance, which can be quantified in several ways.
In terms of Bayesian regret, the performance of AIC worsens by at most a constant multiplicative
factor that only depends on the prior. In terms of the average rewards, we guarantee the following:
for any duration T , the average Bayesian-expected reward of AIC between rounds cP and cP + T
is at least that of the first T/LP rounds in the original algorithm A; here cP and LP are prior-
dependent constants.6 Finally, if A outputs a prediction φt after each round t, then AIC learns
as fast as A, up to a prior-dependent constant factor cP : for every realization of the prior, its
prediction in round t has the same distribution as φ⌊t/cP⌋.
7
The black-box reduction has several benefits other than “modular design”. Most immediately,
one can plug in an MAB algorithm that takes into account the Bayesian prior or any other auxiliary
information that a planner might have. Moreover, one may wish to implement a particular approach
to exploration, e.g., incorporate some constraints on the losses, or preferences about which arms
to favor or to throttle. Further, the planner may wish to predict things other than the best action.
To take a very stark example, the planner may wish to learn what are the worst actions (in order
to eliminate these actions later by other means such as legislation). While the agents would not
normally dwell on low-performing actions, our reduction would then incentivize them to explore
these actions in detail.
Beyond BIC bandit exploration. Our black-box reduction supports much richer scenarios
than BIC bandit exploration. Most importantly, it allows for agent heterogeneity, as expressed by
observable signals. We adopt the framework of contextual bandits, well-established in the machine
learning literature (see Section 2 for citations). In particular, each agent is characterized by a
signal, called context, observable by both the agent and the planner before the planner issues
the recommendation. The context can include demographics, tastes, preferences and other agent-
specific information. It impacts the expected rewards received by this agent, as well as the agent’s
beliefs about these rewards. Rather than choose the best action, the planner now wishes to optimize
a policy that maps contexts to actions. This type of agent heterogeneity is practically important:
for example, websites that issue recommendations may possess a huge amount of information about
their customers, and routinely use this “context” to adjust their recommendations (e.g., Amazon
and Netflix). Our reduction turns an arbitrary contextual bandit algorithm into a BIC one, with
performance guarantees similar to those for the non-contextual version. From the selection bias
perspective, this extension distinguishes the agents based on their observed attributes (i.e., those
included in the context), but protects against the selection bias that arises due to the unobserved
attributes.
Moreover, the reduction allows learning algorithms to incorporate arbitrary auxiliary feedback
that agents’ actions may reveal. For example, a restaurant review may contain not only the overall
evaluation of the agent’s experience (i.e., her reward), but also reveal her culinary preferences,
which in turn may shed light on the popularity of other restaurants (i.e., on the expected rewards
of other actions). Further, an action can consist of multiple “sub-actions”, perhaps under common
constraints, and the auxiliary feedback may reveal the reward for each sub-action. For instance,
6As in (1.1), the prior-dependent constants can get arbitrarily large depending on the prior, even for m= 2 arms,
and can scale exponentially with m in some examples.
7 So if the original algorithm A gives an asymptotically optimal error rate as a function of t, compared to the “correct”
prediction, then so does the transformed algorithm AIC, up to a prior-dependent multiplicative factor.
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a detailed restaurant recommendation may include suggestions for each course, and a review may
contain evaluations thereof. Such problems (without incentive constraints) have been actively stud-
ied in machine learning, under the names “MAB with partial monitoring” and “combinatorial
semi-bandits”; see Section 2 for relevant citations.
We allow for scenarios when the planner wishes to optimize his own utility which is misaligned
with the agents’. Then rewards in our model still correspond to the agents’ utilities, and planner’s
utility is observed by the algorithm as auxiliary feedback. For example, a vendor who recommends
products to customers may favor more expensive products or products that are tied in with his
other offerings. In a different setting, a planner may prefer less expensive options: in a medical
trial with substantial treatment costs, patients (who are getting these treatments for free) are only
interested in their respective health outcomes, whereas a socially responsible planner may also
factor in the treatment costs. Another example is a medical trial of several available immunizations
for the same contagious disease, potentially offering different tradeoffs between the strength and
duration of immunity and the severity of side effects. Hoping to free-ride on the immunity of others,
a patient may assign a lower utility to a successful outcome than the government, and therefore
prefer safer but less efficient options.
A black-box reduction such as ours is particularly desirable for the extended setting described
above, essentially because it is not tied up to a particular variant of the problem. Indeed, contextual
bandit algorithms in the literature heavily depend on the class of policies to optimize over, whereas
our reduction does not. Likewise, algorithms for bandits with auxiliary feedback heavily depend
on the particular kind of feedback.
1.3. Our techniques and assumptions
An essential challenge in BIC exploration is to incentivize agents to explore actions that appear
suboptimal according to the agent’s prior and/or the information currently available to the plan-
ner. The desirable incentives are created due to information asymmetry : the planner knows more
than the agents do, and the recommendation reveals a carefully calibrated amount of additional
information. The agent’s beliefs are then updated so that the recommended action now seems
preferable to others, even though the algorithm may in fact be exploring in this round, and/or the
prior mean reward of this action may be small.
Our problem is hopeless for some priors. For a simple example, consider a prior on two actions
(whose expected rewards are denoted µ1 and µ2) such that E[µ1] > E[µ2] and µ1 is statistically
independent from µ1−µ2. Then, since no amount of samples from action 1 has any bearing on µ1−
µ2, a BIC algorithm cannot possibly incentivize agents to try action 2. To rule out such pathological
examples, we make some assumptions. Our detail-free result assumes that the prior is independent
across actions, and additionally posits minor restrictions in terms of bounded rewards and full
support. The black-box reduction posits a more abstract condition which allows for correlated
priors, and includes independent priors as a special case (with similar minor restrictions). This
condition is necessary for the case of two arms, if the algorithm is “strongly BIC”, i.e., if each
agent’s utility is strictly maximized by the recommended action.
Our algorithms are based on (versions of) a common building block: an algorithm that incen-
tivizes agents to explore at least once during a relatively short time interval (a “phase”). The
idea is to hide one round of exploration among many rounds of exploitation. An agent receiving
a recommendation does not know whether this recommendation corresponds to exploration or to
exploitation. However, the agents’ Bayesian posterior favors the recommended action because the
exploitation is much more likely. Information asymmetry arises because the agent cannot observe
the previous rounds and the algorithm’s randomness.
To obtain BIC algorithms with good performance, we overcome a number of technical challenges,
some of which are listed below. First, an algorithm needs to convince an agent not to switch to
several other actions: essentially, all actions with larger prior mean reward than the recommended
action. In particular, the algorithm should accumulate sufficiently many samples of these actions
9beforehand. Second, we ensure that phase length — i.e., the sufficient size of exploitation pool —
does not need to grow over time. In particular, it helps not to reveal any information to future
agents (e.g., after each phase or at other “checkpoints” throughout the algorithm). Third, for the
black-box reduction we ensure that the choices of the bandit algorithm that we reduce from do not
reveal any information about rewards. In particular, this consideration was essential in formulating
the main assumption in the analysis (Property (P2) on page 20). Fourth, the detail-free algorithm
cannot use Bayesian inference, and relies on sample average rewards to make conclusions about
Bayesian posterior rewards, even though the latter is only an approximation for the former.
1.4. Further discussion on medical trials
We view patients’ incentives as one of the major obstacles that inhibit medical trials in practice,
or prevent some of them from happening altogether. This obstacle may be particularly damaging
for large-scale trials that concern wide-spread medical conditions with relatively inexpensive treat-
ments. Then finding suitable patients and providing them with appropriate treatments would be
fairly realistic, but incentivizing patients to participate in sufficient numbers may be challenging.
BIC exploration is thus a theoretical (and so far, highly idealized) attempt to mitigate this obstacle.
Medical trials have been one of the original motivations for studying MAB and exploration-
exploitation tradeoff [Thompson 1933, Gittins 1979]. Bandit-like designs for medical trials belong
to the realm of adaptive medical trials [Chow and Chang 2008], which can also include other
“adaptive” features such as early stopping, sample size re-estimation, and changing the dosage.
“Message-restricted” algorithms (which recommend particular treatments to patients and reveal
no other information) are appropriate for this domain. Revealing some (but not all) information
about the medical trial is required to meet the standards of “informed consent”, as prescribed
by various guidelines and regulations [see Arango et al. 2012, for background]. However, revealing
information about clinical outcomes in an ongoing trial is currently not required, to the best of our
understanding. In fact, revealing such information is seen as a significant threat to the statistical
validity of the trial (because both patients and doctors may become biased in favor of better-
performing treatments), and care is advised to prevent information leaks as much as possible [see
Detry et al. 2012, for background and discussion, particularly pp. 26-30].
Medical trials provide additional motivation for BIC bandit exploration with multiple actions.
While traditional medical trials compare a new treatment against the placebo or a standard treat-
ment, designs of medical trials with multiple treatments have been studied in the biostatistics
literature [e.g., see Hellmich 2001, Freidlin et al. 2008], and are becoming increasingly important
in practice [Parmar et al. 2014, Redig and Ja¨nne 2015]. Note that even for the placebo or the
standard treatment the expected reward is often not known in advance, as it may depend on the
particular patient population.
BIC contextual bandit exploration is particularly relevant to medical trials, as patients come
with a lot of “context” which can be used to adjust and personalize the recommended treatment.
The context can include age, fitness levels, race or ethnicity, various aspects of the patient’s med-
ical history, as well as genetic markers (increasingly so as genetic sequencing is becoming more
available). Context-dependent treatments (known as personalized medicine) has been an impor-
tant trend in the pharmaceutical industry in the past decade, especially genetic-marker-dependent
treatments in oncology [e.g., see Maitland and Schilsky 2011, Garimella 2015, Vaidyanathan 2012].
Medical trials for context-dependent treatments are more complex, as they must take the context
into account. To reduce costs and address patient scarcity, a number of novel designs for such trials
have been deployed [e.g., see Maitland and Schilsky 2011, Garimella 2015]. Some of the deployed
designs are explicitly “contextual”, in that they seek the best policy — mapping from patient’s con-
text to treatment [Redig and Ja¨nne 2015]. More advanced “contextual” designs have been studied
in biostatistics [e.g., see Freidlin and Simon 2005, Freidlin et al. 2007, 2010].
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2. Related work
Exploration, exploitation, and incentives. There is a growing literature about a three-way
interplay of exploration, exploitation, and incentives, comprising a variety of scenarios.
The study of mechanisms to incentivize exploration has been initiated by Kremer et al. [2014].
They mainly focus on deriving the Bayesian-optimal policy for the case of only two actions and
deterministic rewards, and only obtain a preliminary result for stochastic rewards; a detailed com-
parison is provided below. Bimpikis et al. [2018]8 consider a similar model with time-discounted
rewards, focusing on the case of two arms. If expected rewards are known for one arm, they provide
a BIC algorithm that achieves the “first-best” utility. For the general case, they design an optimal
BIC algorithm that is computationally inefficient, and propose a tractable heuristic based on the
same techniques. Motivated by similar applications in the Internet economy, Che and Ho¨rner [2018]
propose a model with a continuous information flow and a continuum of consumers arriving to a
recommendation system and derive a Bayesian-optimal incentive-compatible policy. Their model
is technically different from ours, and is restricted to two arms and binary rewards. Frazier et al.
[2014] consider a similar setting with monetary transfers, where the planner not only recommends
an action to each agent, but also offers a payment for taking this action. In their setting, incentives
are created via the offered payments rather than via information asymmetry.
Exploration-exploitation problems with self-interested agents have been studied in several
other scenarios: multiple agents engaging in exploration and benefiting from exploration per-
formed by others, without a planner to coordinate them [e.g., Bolton and Harris 1999,
Keller et al. 2005] dynamic pricing with model uncertainty [e.g., Kleinberg and Leighton 2003,
Besbes and Zeevi 2009, Badanidiyuru et al. 2018], dynamic auctions [e.g., Athey and Segal 2013,
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki 2010, Kakade et al. 2013], pay-per-click ad auctions with unknown click
probabilities [e.g., Babaioff et al. 2014, Devanur and Kakade 2009, Babaioff et al. 2015b], as well
as human computation [e.g., Ho et al. 2016, Ghosh and Hummel 2013, Singla and Krause 2013].
In particular, a black-box reduction from an arbitrary MAB algorithm to an incentive-compatible
algorithm is the main result in Babaioff et al. [2015b], in the setting of pay-per-click ad auctions
with unknown click probabilities. The technical details in all this work (who are the agents, what
are the actions, etc.) are very different from ours, so a direct comparison of results is uninformative.
Subsequent work on incentivized exploration. Several papers appeared subsequent to the
conference publication of this paper. Kleinberg et al. [2016] consider costly information acquisition
by self-interested agents (e.g., real estate buyers or venture capitalists investigating a potential
purchase/invenstment), and design a BIC mechanism to coordinate this process so as to improve
social welfare. Bahar et al. [2016] extend the setting in Kremer et al. [2014] — BIC exploration
with two actions and deterministic rewards — to a known social network on the agents, where
each agent can observe friend’s recommendations in the previous rounds (but not their rewards).
Mansour et al. [2016] extend BIC exploration to scenarios when multiple agents arrive in each
round and their chosen actions may affect others’ rewards. The paradigmatic motivating example is
driving directions on Waze, where drivers’ choice of routes can create congestion for other drivers.
The mechanism’s recommendation is correlated across agents. Formally, it is a randomized mapping
from history to joint actions which must be incentive-compatible in the sense of Bayesian correlated
equilibrium. Chen et al. [2018], Immorlica et al. [2019] investigated scenarios with heterogenous
agents. Finally, Kannan et al. [2017] focuses on incentivizing fair exploration, in the sense that
worse arms are never (probabilistically) preferred to better ones.
Mansour et al. [2016], Immorlica et al. [2019] take a different conceptual approach which is com-
plementary to ours: rather than making assumptions to ensure that all agents are “explorable”
(i.e., can be eventually chosen by an incentive-compatible algorithm), they start with no assump-
tions, and strive to explore all actions that can possibly be explored.
8 Bimpikis et al. [2018] is concurrent and independent work with respect to the conference publication of this paper.
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A closely related line of work [Bastani et al. 2018, Kannan et al. 2018, Schmit and Riquelme
2018, Raghavan et al. 2018] considers the “full revelation” scenario, when each agent sees the
full history and chooses an action based on her own incentives. This corresponds to the “greedy
algorithm” in multi-armed bandits. While the greedy algorithm is known to suffer linear regret in
the worst case, it performs well under some (fairly strong) assumptions on the diversity of agent
population.
Information design. As mentioned in the Introduction, a single round of our model is as a version
of the Bayesian Persuasion game [Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011] in which the planner’s signal is
the “history” of the previous rounds. Rayo and Segal [2010] examine a related setting in which a
planner incentivizes agents to make better choices via information disclosure. Ely et al. [2015] and
Ho¨rner and Skrzypacz [2015] consider information disclosure over time, in very different models:
resp., releasing news over time to optimize suspense and surprise, and selling information over
time. More background on the “design of information structures” in theoretical economics can be
found in [Bergemann and Morris 2016, Taneva 2016].
Detailed comparison to Kremer, Mansour, and Perry [2014]. While the expected reward
is determined by the chosen action, we allow the realized reward to be stochastic. Kremer et al.
[2014] mainly focus on deterministic rewards, and only obtain a preliminary result for stochastic
rewards. We improve over the latter result in several ways.
Kremer et al. [2014] only consider the case of two actions, whereas we handle an arbitrary
constant number of actions. Handling more than two actions is important in practice, because
recommendation systems for products or experiences are rarely faced with only binary decisions.
Further, medical trials with multiple treatments are important, too [Hellmich 2001, Freidlin et al.
2008, Parmar et al. 2014]. For multiple actions, convergence to the best action is a new and inter-
esting result on its own, even regardless of the rate of convergence. Our extension to more than
two actions is technically challenging, requiring several new ideas compared to the two-action case;
especially so for the detail-free version.
We implement adaptive exploration, when the exploration schedule is adapted to the previous
observations, whereas the algorithm in Kremer et al. [2014] is a BIC implementation of fixed explo-
ration — a “naive” MAB algorithm in which the exploration schedule is fixed in advance. This
leads to a stark difference in ex-post regret. To describe these improvements, let us define theMAB
instance as a mapping from actions to their expected rewards, and let us be more explicit about
the asymptotic ex-post regret rates as a function of the time horizon T (i.e., the number of agents).
Kremer et al. [2014] only provides regret bound of O˜(T 2/3) for all MAB instances,9 whereas our
algorithm achieves ex-post regret O˜(
√
T ) for all MAB instances, and polylog(T ) for MAB instances
with constant “gap” in the expected reward between the best and the second-best action. The
literature on MAB considers this a significant improvement (more on this below). In particular, the
polylog(T ) result is important in two ways: it quantifies the advantage of “nice” MAB instances
over the worst case, and of IID rewards over adversarially chosen rewards.10 The sub-par regret rate
in Kremer et al. [2014] is indeed a consequence of fixed exploration: such algorithms cannot have
worst-case regret better than Ω(T 2/3), and cannot achieve polylog(T ) regret for MAB instances
with constant gap [Babaioff et al. 2014].
In terms of information structure, the algorithm in Kremer et al. [2014] requires all agents to
have the same prior, and requires a very detailed knowledge of that prior; both are significant
impediments in practice. Whereas our detail-free result allows the planner to have only a very
limited knowledge of the prior, and allows the agents to have different priors.
Finally, Kremer et al. [2014] does not provide an analog of our black-box reduction, and does
not handle the various generalizations of BIC bandit exploration that the reduction supports.
9Here and elsewhere, the O˜(·) notation hides polylog(T ) factors.
10 The MAB problem with adversarially chosen rewards only admits O˜(
√
T ) ex-post regret in the worst case.
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Multi-armed bandits. Multi-armed bandits (MAB) have been studied extensively in Economics,
Operations Research and Computer Science since [Thompson 1933]. Motivations and applications
range from medical trials to pricing and inventory optimization to driving directions to online
advertising to human computation. A reader may refer to [Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi 2012] and
[Gittins et al. 2011] for background on regret-minimizing and Bayesian formulations, respectively.
Further background on related machine learning problems can be found in Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi
[2006]. Our results are primarily related to regret-minimizing MAB formulations with IID rewards
[Lai and Robbins 1985, Auer et al. 2002a].
Our detail-free algorithm builds on Hoeffding races [Maron and Moore 1993, 1997], a well-known
technique in reinforcement learning. Its incarnation in the context of MAB is also known as active
arms elimination [Even-Dar et al. 2006].
The general setting for the black-box reduction is closely related to three prominent direc-
tions in the work on MAB: contextual bandits, MAB with budgeted exploration, and MAB with
partial monitoring. Contextual bandits have been introduced, under various names and mod-
els, in [Woodroofe 1979, Auer et al. 2002b, Wang et al. 2005, Langford and Zhang 2007], and
actively studied since then. We follow the formulation from [Langford and Zhang 2007] and a
long line of subsequent work [e.g., Dud´ık et al. 2011, Agarwal et al. 2014]. In MAB with bud-
geted exploration, algorithm’s goal is to predict the best arm in a given number of rounds, and
performance is measured via prediction quality rather than cumulative reward [Even-Dar et al.
2002, Mannor and Tsitsiklis 2004, Guha and Munagala 2007, Goel et al. 2009, Bubeck et al. 2011].
In MAB with partial monitoring, auxiliary feedback is revealed in each round along with the
reward. A historical account for this direction can be found in Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006]; see
Audibert and Bubeck [2010], Barto´k et al. [2014] for examples of more recent progress. Important
special cases are MAB with graph-structured feedback [Alon et al. 2013, 2015], where choosing an
arm would also bring feedback for adjacent arms, and “combinatorial semi-bandits” [Gyo¨rgy et al.
2007, Kale et al. 2010, Audibert et al. 2011, Wen et al. 2015], where in each round the algorithm
chooses a subset from some fixed ground set, and the reward for each chosen element of this set is
revealed.
Improving the asymptotic regret rate from O˜(T γ), γ > 1
2
to O˜(
√
T ) and from O˜(
√
T ) to
polylog(T ) has been a dominant theme in the literature on regret-minimizing MAB (a through
survey is beyond our scope, see Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi [2012] for background and citations). In
particular, the improvement from O˜(T 2/3) to O˜(
√
T ) regret due to the distinction between fixed
and adaptive exploration has been a major theme in [Babaioff et al. 2014, Devanur and Kakade
2009, Babaioff et al. 2015a].
As much of our motivation comes from human computation, we note that MAB-like problems
have been studied in several other setting motivated by human computation. Most of this work
has focused on crowdsourcing markets, addressing topics such as task-worker matching and pricing
decisions; see Slivkins and Vaughan [2013] for a survey and discussion.
Fairness in ML. The connection between BIC exploration and fairness, observed in Section 1.1,
relates this paper to a growing body of work on fairness in machine learning [e.g., Dwork et al.
2012, Hardt et al. 2016, Kleinberg et al. 2017, Chouldechova 2017]. Some of this work stud-
ies fairness in the context of multi-armed bandits [e.g., Joseph et al. 2016, Liu et al. 2017,
Celis and Vishnoi 2017], albeit with very different motivations and technical formulations. Most
notably, [Joseph et al. 2016, Kearns et al. 2017, Kannan et al. 2017] treat arms as applicants for
limited resources such as bank loans, and require that worse applicants are not preferred to better
ones.
3. Model and preliminaries
We define the basic model, called BIC bandit exploration; the generalizations are discussed in
Section 7. A sequence of T agents arrive sequentially to the planner. In each round t, the interaction
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protocol is as follows: a new agent arrives, the planner sends this agent a signal σt, the agent
chooses an action it in a set A of m possible actions, receives a reward for this action, and leaves
forever. The signal σt includes a recommended action It ∈A. This entire interaction is not observed
by other agents. The planner knows the value of T . However, a coarse upper bound would suffice
in most cases, with only a constant degradation of our results.
The planner chooses signals σt using an algorithm, called recommendation algorithm. If σt = It =
it (i.e., the signal is restricted to the recommended action, which is followed by the corresponding
agent) then the setting reduces to multi-armed bandits (MAB), and the recommendation algorithm
is a bandit algorithm. To follow the MAB terminology, we will use arms synonymously with actions;
we sometimes write “play/pull an arm” rather than “choose an action”.
Rewards. For each arm i there is a parametric family Di(·) of reward distributions, parameterized
by the expected reward µi. The reward vector µ= (µ1, . . . , µm) is drawn from some prior distribution
P0. Conditional on the mean µi, the realized reward when a given agent chooses action i is drawn
independently from distribution Di(µi). In this paper we restrict attention to the case of single
parameter families of distributions, however we do not believe this is a real restriction for our
results to hold.
The prior P0 and the tuple D = (Di(·) : i ∈A) constitute the (full) Bayesian prior on rewards,
denoted P. It is known to all agents and to the planner.11 The expected rewards µi are not known
to either.
For each arm i, let P0i be the marginal of P0 on this arm, and let µ0i =E[µi] be the prior mean
reward. W.l.o.g., re-order the arms so that µ01 ≥ µ02 ≥ . . .≥ µ0m. The prior P is independent across
arms if the distribution P0 is a product distribution, i.e., P0 =P01 × . . .×P0m.
Incentive-compatibility. Each agent t maximizes her own Bayesian expected reward, conditional
on any information that is available to him. Recall that the agent observes the planner’s message
σt, and does not observe anything about the previous rounds. Therefore, the agent simply chooses
an action i that maximizes the posterior mean reward E[µi|σt]. In particular, if the signal does not
contain any new information about the reward vector µ, then the agent simply chooses an action
i that maximizes the prior mean reward E[µi].
We are interested in algorithms that respect incentives, in the sense that the recommended action
i= It maximizes the posterior mean reward. To state this property formally, let Et−1 be the event
that the agents have followed the algorithm’s recommendations up to (and not including) round t.
Definition 3.1. A recommendation algorithm is Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC ) if
E[µi | σt, It = i,Et−1]≥max
j∈A
E[µj | σt, It = i,Et−1] ∀t∈ [T ], ∀i∈A. (3.1)
The algorithm is strongly BIC if Inequality (3.1) is always strict.
Remark 3.1. Throughout this paper, we focus on BIC recommendation algorithms with σt = It.
As observed in Kremer et al. [2014], this restriction is w.l.o.g. in the following sense. First, any
recommendation algorithm can be made BIC by re-defining It to lie in argmaxi E[µi|σt]. Second,
any BIC recommendation algorithm can be restricted to σt = It, preserving the BIC property. Note
that the first step may require full knowledge of the prior and may be computationally expensive.
Thus, for each agent the recommended action is at least as good as any other action. For
simplicity, we assume the agents break ties in favor of the recommended action. Then the agents
always follow the recommended action.
Regret. The goal of the recommendation algorithm is to maximize the expected social welfare,
i.e., the expected total reward of all agents. For BIC algorithms, this is just the total expected
reward of the algorithm in the corresponding instance of MAB.
We measure algorithm’s performance via the standard definitions of regret.
11 As mentioned in Introduction, we also consider an extension to a partially known prior.
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Definition 3.2 (Ex-post Regret). The ex-post regret of the algorithm is:
Rµ(T ) = T (max
i
µi)−E
[
T∑
t=1
µIt | µ
]
(3.2)
The Bayesian regret of the algorithm is:
RP(T ) =E
[
T (max
i
µi)−
T∑
t=1
µIt
]
= E
µ∼P0
[Rµ(T )] . (3.3)
The ex-post regret is specific to a particular reward vector µ; in the MAB terminology, it is
sometimes called MAB instance. In (3.2) the expectation is taken over the randomness in the
realized rewards and the algorithm, whereas in (3.3) it is also taken over the prior. The last
summand in (3.2) is the expected reward of the algorithm.
Ex-post regret allows to capture “nice” MAB instances. Formally, we consider the gap of a
problem instance µ, defined as
∆= µ∗− max
i:µi<µ
∗
µi, where µ
∗ =max
i
µi. (3.4)
In words: the difference between the largest and the second largest expected reward. One way
to characterize “nice” MAB instances is via large gap. There are MAB algorithms with regret
O(min( 1
∆
logT,
√
T logT )) for a constant number of arms Auer et al. [2002a].
The basic performance guarantee is expressed via Bayesian regret. Bounding the ex-post regret
is particularly useful if the prior is not exactly known to the planner, or if the prior that everyone
believes in may not quite the same as the true prior. In general, a ex-post regret also guards against
“unlikely realizations”. Besides, a bound on the ex-post regret is valid for every realization of the
prior, which is reassuring for the social planner and also could take advantage of “nice” realizations
such as the ones with large “gap”.
Concentration inequalities. For our detail-free algorithm, we will use a well-known concen-
tration inequality known as Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound. This concentration inequality, in slightly
different formulations, can be found in many textbooks and surveys [e.g., Mitzenmacher and Upfal
2005]. We use a formulation from the original paper [Hoeffding 1963].
Theorem 3.1 (Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound). Consider n I.I.D. random variables X1 . . .Xn
with values in [0,1]. Let X = 1
n
∑n
i=1Xi be their average, and let µ=E[X]. Then:
Pr(|X −µ|< δ)≥ 1− 2 e−2nδ2 ∀δ ∈ (0,1]. (3.5)
In a typical usage, we consider the high-probability event in Eq. 3.5 for a suitably chosen random
variables Xi (which we call the Chernoff event), use the above theorem to argue that the failure
probability is negligible, and proceed with the analysis conditional on the Chernoff event.
Conditional expectations. Throughout, we often use conditional expectations of the form
E[A|B = b] and E[A|B] where A and B are random variables. To avoid confusion, let us emphasize
that E[A|B = b] evaluates to a scalar, whereas E[A|B] is a random variable that maps values of B
to the corresponding conditional expectations of A. At a high level, we typically use E[A|B = b] in
the algorithms’ specifications, and we often consider E[A|B] in the analysis.
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4. Basic technique: sampling the inferior arm
A fundamental sub-problem in BIC bandit exploration is to incentivize agents to choose any arm
i≥ 2 even once, as initially they would only choose arm 1. (Recall that arms are ordered according
to their prior mean rewards.) We provide a simple stand-alone BIC algorithm that samples each
arm at least k times, for a given k, and completes in time k times a prior-dependent constant.
This algorithm is the initial stage of the black-box reduction, and (in a detail-free extension) of
the detail-free algorithm.
In this section we focus on the special case of two arms, so as to provide a lucid introduction
to the techniques and approaches in this paper. (Extension to many arms, which requires some
additional ideas, is postponed to Section 5). We allow the common prior to be correlated across
arms, under a mild assumption which we prove is necessary. For intuition, we explicitly work out
the special cases of Gaussian priors and beta-binomial priors.
4.1. Restricting the prior
While consider the general case of correlated per-action priors, we need to restrict the common
prior P so as to give our algorithms a fighting chance, because our problem is hopeless for some
priors. As discussed in the Introduction, an easy example is a prior such that µ1 and µ1− µ2 are
independent. Then samples from arm 1 have no bearing on the conditional expectation of µ1−µ2,
and therefore cannot possibly incentivize an agent to try arm 2.
For a “fighting chance”, we assume that after seeing sufficiently many samples of arm 1 there is
a positive probability that arm 2 is better. To state this property formally, we denote with Sk1 the
random variable that captures the first k outcomes of arm 1, and we let
Xk :=E
[
µ2−µ1 | Sk1
]
(4.1)
be the conditional expectation of µ2−µ1 as a function Sk1 . We make the following assumption:
(P1) Pr (Xk > 0)> 0 for some prior-dependent constant k= kP <∞.
In fact, Property (P1) is “almost necessary”: it is necessary for a strongly BIC algorithm.
Lemma 4.1. Consider an instance of BIC bandit exploration with two actions such that Prop-
erty (P1) does not hold. Then a strongly BIC algorithm never plays arm 2.
Proof. Since Property (P1) does not hold, by Borel-Cantelli Lemma we have
Pr (Xt ≤ 0) = 1 ∀t∈N. (4.2)
We prove by induction on t that the t-th agent cannot be recommended arm 2. This is trivially
true for t = 1. Suppose the induction hypothesis is true for some t. Consider an execution of a
strongly BIC algorithm. Such algorithm cannot recommend arm 2 before round t+ 1. Then the
decision whether to recommend arm 2 in round t+ 1 is determined by the t outcomes of action
1. In other words, the event U = {It+1 = 2} belongs to σ(St), the sigma-algebra generated by Xt.
Therefore,
E[µ2−µ1|U ] = 1
Pr (U)
∫
U
µ2−µ1=E[Xt|U ]≤ 0.
The last inequality holds by (4.2). So a strongly BIC algorithm cannot recommend arm 2 in round
t+1. This completes the induction proof. 
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4.2. Algorithm and analysis
We provide a simple BIC algorithm that samples both arms at least k times. The time is divided
into k+1 phases of L rounds each, except the first one, where L is a parameter that depends on
the prior. In the first phase the algorithm recommends arm 1 to K =max{L,k} agents, and picks
the “exploit arm” a∗ as the arm with a highest posterior mean conditional on these K samples.
In each subsequent phase, it picks one agent independently and uniformly at random from the L
agents in this phase, and use this agent to explore arm 2. All other agents exploit using arm a∗. A
more formal description is given in Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: A BIC algorithm to collect k samples of both arms.
Parameters: k,L∈N
1 In the first K =max{L,k} rounds recommend arm 1 ;
2 Let sK1 = (r
1
1, . . . , r
K
1 ) be the corresp. tuple of rewards;
3 Let a∗ = argmaxa∈{1,2}E[µa|sK1 ], breaking ties in favor of arm 1;
for each phase n=2 , . . . , k+1 do
4 From the set P of the next L agents, pick one agent p0 uniformly at random;
5 Every agent p∈P −{p0} is recommended arm a∗;
6 Player p0 is recommended arm 2
end
We prove that the algorithm is BIC as long as L is larger than some prior-dependent constant.
The idea is that, due to information asymmetry, an agent recommended arm 2 does not know
whether this is because of exploration or exploitation, but knows that the latter is much more
likely. For large enough L, the expected gain from exploitation exceeds the expected loss from
exploration, making the recommendation BIC.
Lemma 4.2. Consider BIC bandit exploration with two arms. Assume Property (P1) holds for
some kP , and let Y =X
kP . Algorithm 1 with parameters k,L is BIC as long as
L≥max
(
kP , 1+
µ01−µ02
E[Y |Y > 0]Pr (Y > 0)
)
. (4.3)
The algorithm collects at least k samples from each arm, and completes in kL+max(k,L) rounds.
Note that the denominator in (4.3) is strictly positive by Property (P1). Indeed, the property
implies that Pr (Y > τ) = δ > 0 for some τ > 0, so E[Y |Y > 0]≥ τδ > 0.
Proof. The BIC constraint is trivially satisfied in the initial phase. By a simple observation
from Kremer et al. [2014], which also applies to our setting, it suffices to show that an agent is
incentivized to follow a recommendation for arm 2. Focus on one phase n≥ 2 of the algorithm, and
fix some agent p in this phase. Let Z = µ2−µ1. It suffices to prove that E[Z|Ip =2] Pr (Ip = 2)≥ 0,
i.e., that an agent recommended arm 2 is not incentivized to switch to arm 1.
Let SK1 be the random variable which represents the tuple of the initial samples s
K
1 . Observe
that the event Ip = 2 is uniquely determined by the initial samples S
K
1 and by the random bits of
the algorithm, which are independent of Z. Thus by the law of iterated expectations:
E[Z|Ip =2] =E
[
E
[
Z|SK1
] |Ip = 2]=E[X|Ip =2],
where X =XK = E [Z|SK1 ]. There are two possible disjoint events under which agent p is recom-
mended arm 2: either E1 = {X > 0} or E2 = {X ≤ 0 and p= p0}. Thus,
E[Z|Ip = 2]Pr (Ip = 2)=E[X|Ip = 2]Pr (Ip = 2)
=E[X|E1]Pr (E1)+E[X|E2]Pr (E2) ,
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Observe that:
Pr (E2) = Pr(X ≤ 0) ·Pr (p= p0 | X ≤ 0) = 1L Pr(X ≤ 0) .
Moreover, X is independent of the event {p= p0}. Therefore, we get:
E[Z|Ip = 2]Pr (Ip = 2)= E[X|X > 0]Pr (X > 0)+ 1L E[X|X ≤ 0]Pr (X ≤ 0) .
Thus, for E[Z|Ip = 2]≥ 0 it suffices to pick L such that:
L≥ −E[X|X ≤ 0]Pr (X ≤ 0)
E[X|X > 0]Pr (X > 0) = 1−
E[X]
E[X|X > 0]Pr (X > 0) .
The Lemma follows because E[X] =E[Z] = µ02−µ01 and
E[X|X > 0] Pr (X > 0)≥E[Y |Y > 0] Pr (Y > 0) .
The latter inequality follows from Lemma 4.3, as stated and proved below. Essentially, it holds
because X =XK conditions on more information than Y =XkP : respectively, the first K samples
and the first kP samples of arm 1, where K ≥ kP . 
Lemma 4.3. Let S and T be two random variables such that T contains more information than S,
i.e. if σ(S) and σ(T ) are the sigma algebras generated by these random variables then σ(S)⊂ σ(T ).
Let XS =E[f(µ)|S] and XT =E[f(µ)|T ] for some function f(·) on the vector of means µ. Then:
E[XT |XT > 0]Pr(XT > 0)≥ E[XS|XS > 0]Pr (XS > 0) . (4.4)
Proof. Since the event {XS > 0} is measurable in σ(S) we have:
E[XS|XS > 0] =E [E[f(µ)|S]|XS > 0]=E[f(µ)|XS > 0].
Since σ(S)⊂ σ(T ):
E[f(µ)|XS > 0] =E[E[f(µ)|T ]|XS > 0] =E[XT |XS > 0].
Thus we can conclude:
E[XS |XS > 0] Pr(XS > 0)=E[XT |XS > 0] Pr (XS > 0)
=
∫
{XS>0}
XT
≤
∫
{XT>0}
XT =E[XT |XT > 0] Pr (XT > 0) .

4.3. Example: Gaussian priors
To give more intuition on constants L,kP and random variable Y = X
kP from Lemma 4.2, we
present a concrete example where the prior on the expected reward of each arm is a Normal
distribution, and the rewards are normally distributed conditional on their mean. We are interested
in Xk, as defined in (4.1); we derive an explicit formula for its distribution. We will use N (µ,σ2)
to denote a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2.
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Example 4.1. Assume the prior P is independent across arms, µi ∼N (µ0i , σ2i ) for each arm i, and
the respective reward rti is conditionally distributed as E[r
t
i | µi]∼N (µi, ρ2i ). Then for each k ∈N
Xk ∼N
(
µ02−µ01,
σ21
1+
ρ21/σ
2
1
k
)
. (4.5)
It follows that Property (P1) is satisfied for any k= kP ≥ 1.
Proof. Observe that rt1 = µ1 + ǫ
t
1, where ǫ
t
1 ∼ N (0, ρ21) and µ1 = µ01 + ζ1, with ζ1 ∼ N (0, σ21).
Therefore,
E[µ1 | Sk1 ] =
1
σ21
µ01+
1
ρ21
∑k
t=1 r
t
1
1
σ21
+ k · 1
ρ21
= µ01+
k · 1
ρ21
1
σ21
+ k · 1
ρ21
(
ζ1+
1
k
k∑
t=1
ǫt1
)
= µ01+
k ·σ21
ρ21+ k ·σ21
(
ζ1+
1
k
k∑
t=1
ǫt1
)
.
Since ζ1 +
1
k
∑k
t=1 ǫ
t
1 ∼ N (0, σ21 + ρ21/k), it follows that E[µ1|Sk1 ] is a linear transformation of a
Normal distribution and therefore
E[µ1 | Sk1 ]∼N
(
µ01,
(
k ·σ21
ρ21+ k ·σ21
)2
·
(
σ21 +
ρ21
k
))
=N
(
µ01, σ
2
1
k ·σ21
ρ21+ k ·σ21
)
.
Eq. 4.5 follows because Xk =E[µ2−µ1|Sk1 ] = µ02−E[µ1|Sk1 ]. 
Observe that as k →∞, the variance of Xk increases and converges to the variance of µ1.
Intuitively, more samples can move the posterior mean further away from the prior mean µ0i ; in
the limit of many samples Xk will be distributed exactly the same as µ02−µ1.
While any value of the parameter kP is sufficient for BIC, one could choose kP to minimize
the phase length L. Recall from Lemma 4.2 that the (smallest possible) value of L is inversely
proportional to the quantity E[Y |Y > 0]Pr (Y > 0). This is simply an integral over the positive
region of a normally distributed random variable with negative mean, as given in Eq. 4.5. Thus,
increasing kP increases the variance of this random variable, and therefore increases the integral.
For example, kP = ρ
2
1/σ
2
1 is a reasonable choice if ρ
2
1≫ σ21 .
4.4. Example: beta-binomial priors
Our second example concerns beta-binomial priors, when the prior on the expected reward of each
arm is a beta distribution, and the rewards are 0 or 1. We are interested in Xk, as defined in (4.1).
We use Beta(α,β) to denote the beta distribution with parameters α,β; its expectation is α
α+β
.
Example 4.2. Assume there are only two arms, the prior P is independent across arms, µi ∼
Beta(αi, βi) for each arm i, and the rewards are 0 or 1. Let µ
0
i =
αi
αi+βi
be the prior mean reward
of arm i. Let Zk be the total reward of arm 1 in the first k samples. Then:
(a) For each φ∈ (0, µ02],
E[µ1 | Sk1 ]<φ ⇔
Zk
k
< φ− G(φ)
k
,
where G(φ) := α1−φ(α1+β1) =α1(1−φ/µ01)> 0.
(b) Take φ= µ02 and k >G(φ)/φ. Then Pr (X
k > 0)> 0.
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(c) Take φ= µ02/2 and k > 2 ·G(φ)/φ. Then Pr (Xk ≥ φ)≥ 12 Pr (µ1 ≤ φ/4). Therefore,
E[Xk |Xk > 0] Pr (Xk > 0)≥ φ ·Pr
(
Xk ≥ φ)
≥ φ
2
·Pr (µ1 ≤ φ/4) .
Thus, Property (P1) is satisfied whenever k >G(µ02)/µ
0
2 according to part (b). Part (c) provides
a more quantitative perspective on Lemma 4.2 (and also on Property (P2) in the next section).
Proof. We start with a well-known property of beta-binomial priors: after observing k samples
from arm 1, the posterior distribution of µ1 is Beta(α1+Zk, β1+k−Zk). Accordingly, the posterior
mean reward of this arm is
E[µ1 | Sk1 ] =
α1+Zk
α1+β1+ k
.
Part (a) is obtained by a simple rearrangement of the terms.
Part (b) easily follows from Part (a):
Pr
(
Xk > 0
)
=Pr
(
E[µ1 | Sk1 ]<µ02
)
=Pr (Zk/k < ǫ)> 0,
where ǫ= µ02−G(µ02)/k > 0 (and the last inequality holds for any ǫ > 0).
Part (c) follows from part (a) as follows: Xk ≥ φ holds whenever Zk/k≤ φ/2, so
Pr
(
Xk ≥ φ)≥Pr (Zk/k≤ φ/2)
≥Pr (Zk/k≤ φ/2 | µ1 ≤ φ/4) ·Pr (µ1 ≤ φ/4)
≥ 1
2
·Pr (µ1 ≤ φ/4) .
The last inequality follows from Markov’s inequality. 
5. Black-box reduction from any algorithm
We present a “black-box reduction” that uses a given bandit algorithm A as a black box to create
a BIC algorithm AIC for BIC bandit exploration, with only a minor increase in performance.
The reduction inputs two parameters k,L and works as follows. We start with a “sampling
stage” which collects k samples of each arm in only a constant number of rounds. The sampling
stage for two arms is already implemented in Section 4. The sampling stage for m> 2 arms is a
non-trivial extension of the two-arms case, described below. Then we proceed with a “simulation
stage”, divided in phases of L rounds each. In each phase, we pick one round uniformly at ran-
dom and “dedicate” it to running the original algorithm A. We run A in the “dedicated” rounds
only, ignoring the feedback from all other rounds. In the non-dedicated rounds, we recommend an
“exploit arm”: an arm with the largest posterior mean reward conditional on the samples collected
in the previous phases. A formal description is given in Algorithm 2.
The sampling stage for m > 2 arms works as follows. In order to convince an agent to pull
an arm i > 1, we need to convince him not to switch to any other arm j < i. We implement a
“sequential contest” among the arms. We start with collecting samples of arm 1. The rest of the
process is divided into m− 1 phases 2,3 , . . . ,m, where the goal of each phase i is to collect the
samples of arm i. We maintain the “exploit arm” a∗, the arm with the best posterior mean given
the previously collected samples of arms j < i. The i-th phase collects the samples of arm i using
a procedure similar to that in Section 4: k agents chosen u.a.r. are recommended arm i, and the
rest are recommended the exploit arm. Then the current exploit arm is compared against arm i,
and the “winner” of this contest becomes the new exploit arm. The pseudocode is in Algorithm 3.
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ALGORITHM 2: Black-box reduction: the simulation stage
Input : A bandit algorithm A; parameters k,L∈N.
Input : A dataset S1 which contains k samples from each arm.
1 Split all rounds into consecutive phases of L rounds each;
for each phase n=1, . . . do
2 Let a∗n = argmaxi∈AE[µi|Sn] be the “exploit arm”;
3 Query algorithm A for its next arm selection in;
4 Pick one agent p from the L agents in the phase uniformly at random;
5 Every agent in the phase is recommended a∗n, except agent p who is recommended in;
6 Return to algorithm A the reward of agent p;
7 Set Sn+1 = Sn ∪{all samples collected in this phase}
end
ALGORITHM 3: Black-box reduction: the sampling stage.
Parameters: k,L∈N; the number of arms m.
1 For the first k agents recommend arm 1, let sk1 = {r11, . . . , rk1} be the tuple of rewards;
for each arm i > 1 in increasing lexicographic order do
2 Let a∗ = argmaxa∈AE[µa|sk1 , . . . , ski−1], breaking ties lexicographically;
3 From the set P of the next L · k agents, pick a set Q of k agents uniformly at random;
4 Every agent p∈P −Q is recommended arm a∗;
5 Every agent p∈Q is recommended arm i;
6 Let ski be the tuple of rewards of arm i returned by agents in Q
end
Incentive-compatibility guarantees. We make an assumption on the prior P:
(P2) Let Ski be the the random variable representing k rewards of action i, and let
Xki =min
j 6=i
E[µi−µj |Sk1 , . . . , Ski−1]. (5.1)
There exist prior-dependent constants kP , τP , ρP > 0 such that
Pr
(
Xki > τP
)≥ ρP ∀k > kP , i∈A.
Informally: any given arm i can “a posteriori” be the best arm by margin τP with probability
at least ρP after seeing sufficiently many samples of each arm j < i. We deliberately state this
property in such an abstract manner in order to make our BIC guarantees as inclusive as possible,
e.g., allow for correlated priors, and avoid diluting our main message by technicalities related to
convergence properties of Bayesian estimators.
Remark 5.1. For the special case of two arms, Property (P2) follows from Property (P1), see
Section 8.1 for a proof. Recall that the latter property is necessary for any strongly BIC algorithm.
Remark 5.2. For quantitative perspective, consider the special case of two arms and beta-
binomial priors. See Example 4.2(c) for an instantiation of Property (P2) with specific parameters.
Theorem 5.1 (BIC). Assume Property (P2) holds with constants kP , τP , ρP . Then the black-box
reduction is BIC, for any bandit algorithm A, if the parameters k,L are larger than some prior-
dependent constant. More precisely, it suffices to take
k≥ kP and L≥ 2+ µ
0
max−µ0m
τP · ρP , where µ
0
max=E
[
max
i∈A
µi
]
.
21
We prove Theorem 5.1 in Sections 5.3 and 5.2, separately for the two stages of the algorithm.
If the common prior P puts positive probability on the event that {µi −maxj 6=i µj ≥ τ}, then
Property (P2) is plausible because the conditional expectations tend to approach the true means
as the number of samples grows. We elucidate this intuition via a concrete, and yet fairly general,
example, where we focus on priors that are independent across arms. (See Section 8 for the proof).
Lemma 5.1. Property (P2) holds for a constant number of arms under the following assumptions:
(i) The prior P is independent across arms.
(ii) The prior on each µi has full support on some bounded interval [a, b].
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(iii) The prior mean rewards are all distinct: µ01 >µ
0
2 > . . . > µ
0
m.
(iv) The realized rewards are bounded (perhaps on a larger interval).
Performance guarantees. The algorithm’s performance can be quantified in several ways: in
terms of the total expected reward, the average expected reward, and in terms of Bayesian regret;
we state guarantees for all three. Unlike many results on regret minimization, we do not assume
that expected rewards are bounded.
Theorem 5.2 (Performance). Consider the black-box reduction with parameters k,L, applied to
bandit algorithm A. Let c= k+Lk be the number of rounds in the sampling stage. Then:
(a) Let ÛA(τ1, τ2) be the average Bayesian-expected reward of algorithm A in rounds [τ1, τ2].
Then
ÛAIC(c+1, c+ τ)≥ ÛA(1, ⌊τ/L⌋) for any duration τ .
(b) Let UA(t) be the total Bayesian-expected reward of algorithm A in the first ⌊t⌋ rounds. Then
UAIC(t)≥L ·UA
(
t− c
L
)
+ c ·E
[
min
i∈A
µi
]
.
(c) Let RA(t) be the Bayesian regret of algorithm A in the first ⌊t⌋ rounds.
RAIC(t)≤L ·RA(t/L)+ c ·E
[
max
i∈A
µi−min
i∈A
µi
]
.
In particular, if µi ∈ [0,1] for all arms i, and the original algorithm A achieves asymptotically
optimal Bayesian regret O(
√
t), then so does AIC.
Proof. Recall that a∗n and in are, resp., the “exploit” arm and the original algorithm’s selection
in phase n. Part (a) follows because E
[∑N
n=1 µin
]
= ÛA(1,N), where N is the number of phases,
and by definition of the “exploit” arm we have E[µa∗n |Sn]≥E[µin |Sn] for each phase n.
Parts (b) and (c) follow easily from part (a) by going, resp., from average rewards to total
rewards, and from total rewards to regret. We have no guarantee whatsoever on the actions chosen
in the first c rounds, so we assume the worst: in part (b) we use the worst possible Bayesian-
expected reward E [maxi∈A µi], and in part (c) we use worst possible per-round Bayesian regret
E [maxi∈A µi−mini∈A µi]. 
5.1. The black-box reduction with predictions
We can also allow the original algorithm A to output a prediction in each round. For our purposes,
the prediction is completely abstract: it can be any element in the given set of possible predictions.
It can be a predicted best arm, the estimated gap between the best and the second-best arms (in
terms of their expected rewards), or any other information that the planner wishes to learn. For
example, as pointed out in the Introduction, the planner may wish to learn the worst action (or
12 That is, the prior on µi assigns a strictly positive probability to every open subinterval of [a, b], for each arm i.
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several worst actions, and possibly along with their respective rewards), in order to eliminate these
actions via regulation and legislation.
The black-box reduction can be easily modified to output predictions, visible to the planner
but not to agents. In each phase n, the reduction records the prediction made by A, denote it
by φn. In each round of the initial sampling stage, and in each round of the first phase (n = 1)
the reduction outputs the “null” prediction. In each round of every subsequent phase n ≥ 2, the
reduction outputs φn−1.
Predictions are not visible to agents and therefore have no bearing on their incentives; therefore,
the resulting algorithm is BIC by Theorem 5.1.
We are interested in the sample complexity of AIC: essentially, how the prediction quality grows
over time. Such guarantee is meaningful even if the performance guarantees from Theorem 5.2
are not strong. We provide a very general guarantee: essentially, AIC learns as fast as A, up to a
constant factor.
Theorem 5.3. Consider the black-box reduction with parameters k,L, and let c = k + Lk be the
number of rounds in the sampling stage. Then the prediction returned by algorithm AIC in each
round t > c+L has the same distribution as that returned by algorithm A in round ⌊(t− c)/L⌋.
5.2. Proof of Theorem 5.1: the sampling stage
To guarantee the BIC property for the sampling stage of the algorithm, it suffices to have a
somewhat weaker bound on parameter L than stated in Theorem 5.1. Namely, we will only assume
L≥ 1+ µ
0
1−µ0m
τP · ρP .
The algorithm can be split intom phases, where each phase except the first one lasts L ·k rounds,
and agents are aware which phase they belong to. We will argue that each agent p in each phase i
has no incentive not to follow the recommended arm. If an agent in phase i is recommended any
arm j 6= i, then she knows that this is because this is the exploit arm a∗i ; so by definition of the
exploit arm it is incentive-compatible for the agent to follow it. Thus it remains to argue that an
agent p in phase i who is recommended arm i does not want to deviate to some other arm j 6= i,
i.e., that E[µi−µj |Ip = i]Pr (Ip = i)≥ 0.
Denote Xij :=E[µi−µj|Sk1 , . . . , Ski−1] and Xi :=Xki =minj 6=iXij.
By the law of iterated expectations:
E[µi−µj |Ip = i]Pr (Ip = i) =E[E[µi−µj |Sk1 , . . . , Ski−1]|Ip = i] Pr (Ip = i)
=E[Xij |Ip = i]Pr (Ip = i) .
There are two possible disjoint events under which agent p is recommended arm i, either E1 =
{Xi > 0} or E2= {Xi ≤ 0 and p∈Q}. Thus:
E[µi−µj |Ip = i]Pr (Ip = i) =E[Xij |Ip = i]Pr (Ip = i)
=E[Xij |E1]Pr (E1)+E[Xij |E2]Pr (E2) .
Observe that:
Pr (E2) =Pr (Xi ≤ 0) ·Pr (p∈Q | Xi ≤ 0) = 1
L
Pr (Xi ≤ 0) .
Moreover, Xij is independent of the event {p∈Q}. Therefore, we get:
E[µi−µj |Ip = i]Pr (Ip = i) = E[Xij |Xi > 0]Pr (Xi > 0)+ 1L E[Xij |Xi ≤ 0]Pr (Xi ≤ 0)
= E[Xij |Xi > 0]Pr (Xi > 0)
(
1− 1
L
)
+ 1
L
E[Xij]
= E[Xij |Xi > 0]Pr (Xi > 0)
(
1− 1
L
)
+ 1
L
(
µ0i −µ0j
)
≥ E[Xi|Xi > 0]Pr (Xi > 0)
(
1− 1
L
)
+ 1
L
(
µ0i −µ0j
)
.
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In the above, we used the facts that E[Xij ] =E[µi−µj] = µ0i −µ0j and that Xij ≥Xi. Thus it suffices
to pick L such that:
L≥ 1+ µ
0
j −µ0i
E[Xi|Xi > 0]Pr (Xi > 0) .
The theorem follows by our choice of L and since µ0j − µ0i ≤ µ01 − µ0i for all j ∈ A, and by Prop-
erty (P2) we have that E[Xi|Xi > 0]Pr (Xi > 0)≥ τP · ρP .
5.3. Proof of Theorem 5.1: the simulation stage
Instead using Property (P2) directly, we will work with a somewhat weaker corollary thereof:
(P3) Let Λk be a random variable representing ki ≥ k samples from each action i. There exist
prior-dependent constants k∗P <∞ and τP , ρP > 0 such that
∀k≥ k∗P ∀i∈A Pr
(
min
j∈A−{i}
E [µi−µj |Λk]≥ τP
)
≥ ρP .
Property (P3) is derived in Section 8.1.
Let us consider phase n of the algorithm. We will argue that any agent p who is recommended
some arm j does not want to switch to some other arm i. More formally, we assert that
E[µj −µi|Ip = j] Pr (Ip = j)≥ 0.
Let Sn be the random variable which represents the dataset Sn collected by the algorithm by
the beginning of phase n. Let Xnji =E[µj −µi|Sn] and Xnj =mini∈A/{j}Xnji. It suffices to show:
E
[
Xnj |Ip = j
]
Pr (Ip = j)≥ 0 .
Call an agent unlucky if it is chosen as agent p in Algorithm 2. There are two possible ways
that agent p is recommended arm j: either arm j is the best posterior arm, i.e., Xnj > 0, and agent
i is not the unlucky agent or Xnj < 0, in which case arm j cannot possibly be the exploit arm
a∗n and therefore, Ip = j happens only if agent p was the unlucky one agent among the L agents
of the phase to be recommended the arm of algorithm A and algorithm A recommended arm j.
There are also the followings two cases: (i) Xnj = 0 or (ii) X
n
j > 0, agent p is the unlucky agent and
algorithm A recommends arm j. However, since we only want to lower bound the expectation and
since under both these events Xnj ≥ 0, we will disregard these events, which can only contribute
positively.
Denote with U the index of the “unlucky” agent selected in phase n to be given recommendation
of the original algorithm A. Denote with Anj the event that algorithm A pulls arm j at iteration
n. Thus by our reasoning in the previous paragraph:
E
[
Xnj |Ip = j
]
Pr(Ip = j)≥E[Xnj |Xnj ≥ 0,U 6= p] Pr
(
Xnj ≥ 0,U 6= p
)
+E[Xnj |Xnj < 0,U = p,Anj ] Pr
(
Xnj < 0,U = p,Anj
)
(5.2)
Since Xnj is independent of U , we can drop conditioning on the event {U = p} from the conditional
expectations in Eq. 5.2. Further, observe that:
Pr
(
Xnj < 0,U = p,Anj
)
=Pr
(
U = p | Xnj < 0,Anj
)
Pr
(
Xnj < 0,Anj
)
= 1
L
Pr
(
Xnj < 0,Anj
)
Pr
(
Xnj ≥ 0,U 6= p
)
=Pr
(
U 6= p | Xnj ≥ 0
)
Pr
(
Xnj ≥ 0
)
=
(
1− 1
L
)
Pr
(
Xnj ≥ 0
)
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Plugging this into Eq. 5.2, we can re-write it as follows:
E
[
Xnj |Ip = j
]
Pr(Ip = j)≥
(
1− 1
L
)
E[Xnj |Xnj ≥ 0] Pr
(
Xnj ≥ 0
)
+ 1
L
E[Xnj |Xnj < 0,Anj ]Pr
(
Xnj < 0,Anj
)
. (5.3)
Observe that conditional on {Xnj < 0}, the integrand of the second part in the latter summation
is always non-positive. Thus integrating over a bigger set of events can only decrease it, i.e.:
E[Xnj |Xnj < 0,Anj ]Pr
(
Xnj < 0,Anj
)≥ E[Xnj |Xnj < 0]Pr(Xnj < 0)
Plugging this into Eq. 5.3, we can lower bound the expected gain as:
E
[
Xnj |Ip = j
]
Pr(Ip = j)≥
(
1− 1
L
)
E[Xnj |Xnj ≥ 0]Pr
(
Xnj ≥ 0
)
+ 1
L
E[Xnj |Xnj < 0]Pr
(
Xnj < 0
)
= E[Xnj |Xnj ≥ 0]Pr
(
Xnj ≥ 0
)
L−2
L
+ 1
L
E[Xnj ].
Now observe that:
E[Xnj ] =E
[
min
i∈A/{j}
E[µj −µi|Sn]
]
≥ E
[
E
[
min
i∈A/{j}
(µj −µi)|Sn
]]
=E
[
µj − max
i∈A/{j}
µi
]
= µ0j −µ0max.
By property (P3), we have that Pr
(
Xnj ≥ τP
)≥ ρP . Therefore:
E[Xnj |Xnj ≥ 0]Pr
(
Xnj ≥ 0
)≥ τP · ρP > 0.
Thus the expected gain is lower bounded by:
E
[
Xnj |Ip = j
]
Pr(Ip = j)≥ τP · ρP L− 2
L
+
1
L
(µ0j −µ0max).
The latter is non-negative if:
L≥ µ
0
max−µ0j
τP · ρP +2
Since this must hold for every any j, we get that for incentive compatibility it suffices to pick:
L≥ maxj∈A(µ
0
max−µ0j)
τP · ρP +2=
µ0max−µ0m
τP · ρP +2.
6. Ex-post regret bounds with a detail-free algorithm
We present a BIC algorithm with near-optimal bounds on ex-post regret, both for “nice” MAB
instances and in the worst case over all MAB instances. Our algorithm, called DetailFreeRace,
is “detail-free”, as it requires only a limited knowledge of the prior. This is an improvement over
the results in the preceding section, whcih relied on the precise knowledge of the prior, and only
provided performance guarantees in expectation over the prior.
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6.1. Results and discussion
We use an assumption to restrict the common prior, like in the previous sections. We need this
assumption not only to give the algorithm a “fighting chance”, but also to ensure that the sample
average of each arm is a good proxy for the respective posterior mean. Hence, we focus on priors
that are independent across arms, assume bounded rewards, and full support for each µi.
(P4) The prior is independent across arms; rewards lie in [0,1]; each µi has full support on [0,1].
However, we make no assumptions on the distribution of each µi and on the parameterized reward
distributions D(µi), other than the bounded support.
Our algorithm needs to know the ordering of the arms, an approximation to the smallest prior
mean reward, and an upper bound on a certain prior-independent threshold.
Assumption 6.1. Algorithm DetailFreeRace knows the following:
• the ordering of the arms according to their prior mean rewards;
• the smallest prior mean reward µ0m, or a parameter µˆ such that µ0m ≤ µˆ≤ 2µ0m;
• a certain threshold NP that depends only on the prior P, or a parameter N ≥NP .
A loose upper bound on the threshold NP suffices to guarantee BIC property, but hurts algorithm’s
regret. Since the algorithm does not know the exact prior, it avoids posterior updates, and instead
estimates the expected reward of each arm with its sample average.
The high-level guarantees for DetailFreeRace can be stated as follows:
Theorem 6.1. Algorithm DetailFreeRace is parameterized by two positive numbers (µˆ,N).
(a) The algorithm is BIC if Property (P4) holds, µ0m> 0, and Assumption 6.1 is satisfied.
(b) The algorithm achieves ex-post regret
R(t)≤min
(
CN ·∆+ O(m logTN)
∆
, t∆
)
≤CN +O
(√
mt · log(TN)
)
.
Here ∆ is the gap, defined as per (3.4), T is the time horizon, m is the number of arms, and
CN =N+N
2(m−1). This regret bound holds for each round t≤ T and any value of the parameters.
The dependence on the prior P creeps in via threshsold NP and parameter N ≥NP .
Due to the detail-free property we can allow agents to have different priors (subject to some
assumptions). For example, all agents can start with the same prior, and receive idiosyncratic
signals before the algorithm begins. Further, agents do not even need to know their own priors
exactly. We state this formally as follows:
Corollary 6.1. The BIC property holds even if agents have different priors, and incomplete
knowledge of the said priors, as long as (i) all agents agree on the ordering of prior mean rewards
(which is known to the algorithm), (ii) each agent’s prior satisfies the conditions in Assumption 6.1
for the chosen parameters (µˆ,N), and (iii) each agent knows that her prior satisfies (i) and (ii).
Our algorithm consists of two stages. The sampling stage samples each arm a given number of
times; it is a detail-free version of Algorithm 3. The racing stage is a BIC version of Active Arms
Elimination, a bandit algorithm from Even-Dar et al. [2006]. Essentially, arms “race” against one
another and drop out over time, until only one arm remains.13
We present a somewhat more flexible parametrization of the algorithm than in Theorem 6.1,
which allows for better additive constants. In particular, instead of one parameter N we use several
parameters, so that each parameter needs to be larger than a separate prior-dependent threshold in
order to guarantee the BIC property. To obtain Theorem 6.1, we simply make all these parameters
equal to N , and let NP be the largest threshold.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: we present the sampling stage in Section 6.2, then
the racing stage in Section 6.3, and wrap up the proof of the main theorem in Section 6.4. The
special case of two arms is substantially simpler, we provide a standalone exposition in Appendix A.
13 This approach is known as Hoeffding race in the literature, as Azuma-Hoeffding inequality is used to guarantee the
high-probability selection of the best arm; see Related Work for relevant citations.
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6.2. The detail-free sampling stage
To build up intuition, consider the special case of two arms. Our algorithm is similar to Algorithm 1,
but chooses the “exploit” arm a∗ in a different way. Essentially, we use the sample average reward
µˆ1 of arm 1 instead of its posterior mean reward, and compare it against the prior mean reward µ
0
2 of
arm 2 (which is the same as the posterior mean of arm 2, because the common prior is independent
across arms). To account for the fact that µˆ1 is only an imprecise estimate of the posterior mean
reward, we pick arm 2 as the exploit arm only if µ02 exceeds µˆ1 by a sufficient margin. The detailed
pseudocode and a standalone analysis of this algorithm can be found in Appendix A.
Now we turn to the general case of m> 2 arms. On a very high level, the sampling stage proceeds
as in Algorithm 3: after collecting some samples from arm 1, the process again is split into m− 1
phases such that arm i is explored in phase i. More precisely, rounds with arm i are inserted
uniformly at random among many rounds in which the “exploit arm” a∗i is chosen.
However, the definition of the exploit arm is rather tricky, essentially because it must be made
“with high confidence” and cannot based on brittle comparisons. Consider a natural first attempt:
define the “winner” wi of the previous phases as an arm j < i with the highest average reward,
and pick the exploit arm to be either wi or i, depending on whether the sample average reward
of arm wi is greater than the prior mean reward of arm i. Then it is not clear that a given arm,
conditional on being chosen as the exploit arm, will have a higher expected reward than any other
arm: it appears that no Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound argument can lead to such a conclusion. We
resolve this issue by always using arm 1 as the winner of previous phases (wi = 1), so that the
exploit arm at phase i is either arm 1 or arm i. Further, we alter the condition to determine which
of the two arms is the exploit arm: for each phase i > 2, this condition now involves comparisons
with the previously considered arms. Namely, arm i is the exploit arm if only if the sample average
reward of each arm j ∈ (1, i) is larger than the sample average reward of arm 1 and smaller than
the prior mean reward of arm i, and both inequalities hold by some margin.
The pseudocode is in Algorithm 4. The algorithm has three parameters k,L,C, whose meaning
is as follows: the algorithm collects k samples from each arm, each phase lasts for kL rounds, and
C is the safety margin in a rule that defines the exploit arm. Note that the algorithm completes
in k+Lk(m− 1) rounds.
ALGORITHM 4: The detail-free sampling stage: samples each arm k times.
Parameters: k,L∈N and C ∈ (0,1)
1 For the first k agents recommend arm 1, and let µˆk1 be their average reward;
for each arm i > 1 in increasing lexicographic order do
if µˆk1 <µ
0
i −C and µˆk1 +C < µˆkj <µ0i −C for all arms j ∈ (1, i) then
a∗i = i
else
a∗i = 1
end
2 From the set P of the next L · k agents, pick a set Q of k agents uniformly at random;
3 Every agent p∈P −Q is recommended arm a∗i ;
4 Every agent p∈Q is recommended arm i;
5 Let µˆki be the average reward among the agents in Q;
end
The provable guarantee for Algorithm 4 is stated as follows.
Lemma 6.1. Assume Property (P4). Fix C ∈ (0, µ0m/3) and consider event
E = {∀j ∈A−{1,m} : µ1+ 3C2 ≤ µj ≤ µ0m− 3C2 } .
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Algorithm 4 is BIC if parameters k,L are large enough:
k≥ 8C−2 log
(
16m
C ·Pr (E)
)
and L≥ 1+2 µ
0
1−µ0m
C ·Pr (E) . (6.1)
Observe that Pr (E)> 0 by Property (P4), using the fact that C <µ0m/3.
Proof. Consider agent p in phase i of the algorithm. Recall that she is recommended either arm
1 or arm i. We will prove incentive-compatibility for the two cases separately.
Let Eˆi be the event that the exploit arm a∗i in phase i is equal to i. By algorithm’s specification,
Eˆi = {µˆk1 ≤ min
1<j<i
µˆj −C and max
1≤j<i
µˆj ≤ µ0i −C}.
Part I: Recommendation for arm i. We will first argue that an agent p who is recommended
arm i does not want to switch to any other arm j. The case j > i is trivial because no information
about arms j or i has been collected by the algorithm (because the prior is independent across
arms), and µ0i ≥ µ0j . Thus it suffices to consider j < i. We need to show that
E[µ0i −µj|Ip = i]Pr (Ip = i)≥ 0.
Agent p is in the “explore group” Q with probability 1
L
and in the “exploit group” P −Q with
the remaining probability 1− 1
L
. Conditional on being in the explore group, the expected gain from
switching to arm j is µ0i −µ0j , since that event does not imply any information about the rewards.
If she is in the exploit group, then all that recommendation for arm i implies is that event Eˆi has
happened. Thus:
E[µ0i −µj |Ip = i]Pr (Ip = i) =E[µ0i −µj |Eˆi]Pr
(
Eˆi
)
· (1− 1
L
)
+
µ0i −µ0j
L
.
Thus for the algorithm to be BIC we need to pick a sufficiently large parameter L:
L≥ 1+ µ
0
j −µ0i
E[µ0i −µj |Eˆi]Pr
(
Eˆi
) .
It remains to lower-bound the denominator in the above equation. Consider the Chernoff event:
C = {∀i ∈A : |µˆki −µi| ≤ ǫ}.
Observe that by Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound and the union bound:
∀µ1, . . . , µm : Pr (C | µ1, . . . , µm)≥ 1−m · 2 e−2ǫ2k.
Now observe that since µi ∈ [0,1] and by the Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound:
E[µ0i −µj |Eˆi]Pr
(
Eˆi
)
= E[µ0i −µj |Eˆi,C]Pr
(
Eˆi,C
)
+E[µ0i −µj |Eˆi,¬C]Pr
(
Eˆi,¬C
)
≥ E[µ0i −µj |Eˆi,C]Pr
(
Eˆi,C
)
− 2 e−2ǫ2k.
Observe that conditional on the events Eˆi and C, we know that µ0i − µj ≥ C − ǫ, since event Eˆi
implies that µ0i ≥ µˆkj +C and event C implies that µˆkj ≥ µj − ǫ. Thus we get:
E[µ0i −µj |Eˆi]Pr
(
Eˆi
)
≥ (C− ǫ)Pr
(
Eˆi,C
)
−m · 2 e−2ǫ2k.
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Now let:
Ei = {µ1 ≤ min
1<j<i
µj −C − 2ǫ and max
1≤j<i
µj ≤ µ0i −C − 2ǫ} ,
i.e., Ei is a version of Eˆi but on the true mean rewards, rather than the sample averages. Observe
that under event C, event Ei implies event Eˆi. Thus:
Pr (Ei,C)≤Pr
(
Eˆi,C
)
. (6.2)
Moreover, by Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound:
Pr (Ei,C) = Pr(C | Ei)Pr (Ei)≥
(
1−m · e−2ǫ2k
)
Pr(Ei) . (6.3)
Hence, we conclude that:
E[µ0i −µj |Eˆi]Pr
(
Eˆi
)
≥ (C− ǫ)
(
1−m · e−2ǫ2k
)
Pr (Ei)−m · 2 e−2ǫ2k.
By taking ǫ= C
4
and k≥ 2ǫ−2 log
(
16m
C·Pr(Ei)
)
we get that:
E[µ0i −µj |Eˆi]Pr
(
Eˆi
)
≥ 3
4
C
(
1− 1
8
)
Pr(Ei)− 18C Pr (Ei)≥ 12C Pr (Ei) .
Thus it suffices to pick:
L≥ 1+2 µ
0
j −µ0i
C Pr (Ei) .
In turn, since µ0j ≤ µ01 it suffices to pick the above for j = 1.
Part II: Recommendation for arm 1.When agent p is recommended arm 1 she knows that she
is not in the explore group, and therefore all that is implied by the recommendation is the event
¬Ei. Thus we need to show that for any arm j ≥ 1:
E[µ1−µj |¬Ei]Pr (¬Ei)≥ 0.
It suffices to consider arms j ≤ i. Indeed, if an agent does not want to deviate to arm j = i then she
also does not want to deviate to any arm j > i, because at phase i the algorithm has not collected
any information about arms j ≥ i.
Now observe the following:
E[µ1−µj | 6= Ei]Pr (¬Ei) = E[µ1−µj]−E[µ1−µj |Ei]Pr (Ei)
= µ01−µ0j +E[µj −µ1|Ei]Pr (Ei)
Since, by definition µ01 ≥ µ0j , it suffices to show that for any j ∈ [2, i]:
E[µj −µ1|Ei]Pr (Ei)≥ 0.
If j = i, the above inequality is exactly the incentive-compatibility constraint that we showed in
the first part of the proof. Thus we only need to consider arms j ∈ [2, i− 1].
Similar to the first part of the proof, we can write:
E[µj −µ1|Ei]Pr (Ei)≥E[µj −µ1|Ei,C]Pr (Ei,C)− 2me−2ǫ2k.
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By similar arguments, since Ei implies that µˆkj ≥ µˆk1 +C and since C implies that µj ≥ µˆkj − ǫ and
µˆk1 ≥ µ1− ǫ, we have that the intersection of the two events implies µj ≥ µ1+C − 2ǫ. Hence:
E[µj −µ1|Ei]Pr (Ei)≥ (C− 2ǫ)Pr
(
Eˆi,C
)
− 2me−2ǫ2k.
By Equations (6.2) and (6.3)
E[µj −µ1|Ei]Pr (Ei)≥ (C− 2ǫ)
(
1− 2me−2ǫ2k
)
Pr(Ei)−me−2ǫ2k.
Setting ǫ and k same way as in the first part, we have
E[µj −µ1|Ei]Pr (Ei)≥ 12C
(
1− 1
8
)
Pr(Ei)− 18C Pr (Ei) = 516C Pr (Ei)≥ 0.
Wrapping up. We proved that both potential recommendations in phase i are BIC if we take
ǫ=C/4 and
k≥ 8C−2 log
(
8m
C ·Pr (Ei)
)
and L≥ 1+2 µ
0
1−µ0m
C ·Pr (Ei) .
Eq. 6.1 suffices to ensure the above for all i because E = Em ⊂Ei for all phases i <m. 
6.3. The detail-free racing stage
The detail-free racing stage is a BIC version of Active Arms Elimination, a bandit algorithm from
Even-Dar et al. [2006]. Essentially, arms “race” against one another and drop out over time, until
only one arm remains. More formally, the algorithm proceeds as follows. Each arm is labeled
“active” initially, but may be permanently “deactivated” once it is found to be sub-optimal with
high confidence. Only active arms are chosen. The time is partitioned into phases: in each phase
the set of active arms is recomputed, and then all active arms are chosen sequentially. To guarantee
incentive-compatibility, the algorithm is initialized with some samples of each arm, collected in the
sampling stage. The pseudocode is in Algorithm 5.
ALGORITHM 5: The detail-free racing stage.
Input : parameters k ∈N and θ≥ 1; time horizon T .
Input : k samples of each arm i, denoted r1i , . . . , r
k
i .
1 Initialize the set of active arms: B = {all arms};
2 Split the remainder into consecutive phases, starting from phase n= k;
repeat
// Phase n
3 Let µˆni =
1
n
∑n
t=1 r
t
i be the sample average for each arm i ∈B;
4 Let µˆn∗ =maxi∈B µˆ
n
i be the largest average reward so far;
5 Recompute B =
{
arms i : µˆn∗ − µˆni ≤
√
log(Tθ)
n
}
;
6 To the next |B| agents, recommend each arm i∈B sequentially in lexicographic order;
7 Let rn+1i be the reward of each arm i∈B in this phase;
8 n= n+1;
until |B|=1;
9 For all remaining agents recommend the single arm a∗ that remains in B
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Lemma 6.2 (BIC). Fix an absolute constant τ ∈ (0,1) and let
θτ =
4m2
τ
/
min
i∈A
Pr
(
µi−max
j 6=i
µj ≥ τ
)
.
Algorithm 5 is BIC if Property (P4) holds and the parameters satisfy θ≥ θτ and k≥ θ2τ log(T ).
Proof. We will show that for any agent p in the racing stage and for any two arms i, j ∈A:
E[µi−µj |Ip = i]Pr (Ip = i)≥ 0.
In fact, we will prove a stronger statement:
E[µi−max
j 6=i
µj |Ip = i]Pr (Ip = i)≥ 0. (6.4)
For each pair of arms i, j ∈A, denote Zij = µi−µj and
Zi = µi−max
j 6=i
µj =min
j 6=i
Zij .
For each phase n, let zˆnij = µˆ
n
i − µˆnj . For simplicity of notation, we assume that samples of eliminated
arms are also drawn at each phase but simply are not revealed or used by the algorithm.
Let cn=
√
log(Tθ)
n
be the threshold in phase n of the algorithm. Consider the “Chernoff event”:
C = {∀n≥ k,∀i, j ∈A : |Zij − zˆnij |< cn} .
By Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound and the union bound, for any Z, we have:
Pr (¬C|Z)≤
∑
n≥n∗
∑
i,j∈A
Pr
(|Zij − zˆnij | ≥ cnn)≤ ∑
n≥n∗
∑
i,j∈A
e−2n·c
2
n
≤ T ·m2 · e−2 log(Tθ) ≤ m
2
θ
.
Given the above and since Zi ≥−1 we can write:
E[Zi|Ip = i]Pr (Ip = i) = E[Zi|Ip = i,C]Pr (Ip = i,C)+E[Zi|Ip = i,¬C]Pr (Ip = i,¬C)
≥ E[Zi|Ip = i,C]Pr (Ip = i,C)− m
2
θ
. (6.5)
From here on, we will focus on the first term in Eq. 6.5. Essentially, we will assume that Chernoff-
Hoeffding Bound hold deterministically.
Consider phase n. Denote n∗= θ2τ log(T ), and recall that n≥ k≥ n∗.
We will split the integral E[Zi|Ip = i,C] into cases for the value of Zi. Observe that by the
definition of cn we have cn ≤ cn∗ ≤ τ Pr(Zi≥τ)4 . Hence, conditional on C, if Zi ≥ τ ≥ 2cn∗, then we
have definitely eliminated all other arms except arm i at phase n= k≥ n∗, since
zˆnij >Zij − cn ≥Zi− cn≥ cn.
Moreover, if Zi ≤−2cn, then by similar reasoning, we must have already eliminated arm i, since
µˆni − µˆn∗ =min
j 6=i
zˆnij <min
j 6=i
Zij + cn =Zi+ cn≤−cn.
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Thus in that case Ip = i, cannot occur. Moreover, if we ignore the case when Zi ∈ [0, τ), then the
integral can only decrease, since the integrand is non-negative. Since we want to lower bound it,
we will ignore this region. Hence:
E[Zi|Ip = i,C]Pr (Ip = i,C)≥ τ Pr(C,Zi ≥ τ)− 2 · cnPr (C,−2cn≤Zi ≤ 0)
≥ τ Pr(C,Zi ≥ τ)− 2 · cn (6.6)
≥ τ Pr(C,Zi ≥ τ)− τ ·Pr (Zi ≥ τ)
2
. (6.7)
Moreover, we can lower-bound the term Pr (C,Zi ≥ τ) using Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound:
Pr (C,Zi ≥ τ) = Pr (C|Zi ≥ τ)Pr (Zi ≥ τ)≥
(
1−
∑
t≥n∗
∑
i,j∈A
e−2c
2
nt
)
·Pr (Zi ≥ τ)
≥ (1−m2/θ) ·Pr (Zi ≥ τ)≥ 34 Pr (Zi ≥ τ) .
Plugging this back into Eq. 6.7, we obtain:
E[Zi|Ip = i,C]Pr (Ip = i,C)≥ τ4 ·Pr (C,Zi ≥ τ) .
Plugging this back into Eq. 6.5 and using the fact that θ≥ θτ , we obtain Eq. 6.4. 
Lemma 6.3 (Regret). Algorithm 5 with any parameters k ∈N and θ≥ 1 achieves ex-post regret
R(T )≤
∑
arms i
18 log(Tθ)
µ∗−µi , where µ
∗ =max
i∈A
µi. (6.8)
Denoting ∆=mini∈A µ
∗−µi, and letting n∗ be the duration of the initial sampling stage, the ex-post
regret for each round t of the entire algorithm (both stages) is
R(t)≤min
(
n∗∆+
18m log(Tθ)
∆
, t∆
)
≤ n∗+O
(√
mt log(Tθ)
)
. (6.9)
The “logarithmic” regret bound (6.8) is proved via standard techniques, e.g., see Even-Dar et al.
[2006]. We omit the details from this version. To derive the corollary (6.9), observe that the ex-post
regret of the entire algorithm (both stages) is at most that of the second stage plus ∆ per each
round of the first stage; alternatively, we can also upper-bound it by ∆ per round.
6.4. Wrapping up: proof of Theorem 6.1
To complete the proof of Theorem 6.1, it remains to transition to the simpler parametrization,
using only two parameters µˆ∈ [µ0m,2µ0m] and N ≥NP , where NP is a prior-dependent constant.
Let us define the parameters for both stages of the algorithm as follows. Define parameter C
for the sampling stage as C = µˆ/6, and set the remaining parameters k∗,L for the sampling stage
and k, θ for the racing stage be equal to N . To define NP , consider the thresholds for k
∗,L in
Lemma 6.1 with C = µ0m/6, and the thresholds for k, θ in Lemma 6.2 with any fixed τ ∈ (0,1), and
let NP be the largest of these four thresholds. This completes the algorithm’s specification.
It is easy to see that both stages are BIC. (For the sampling stage, this is because Pr (E)
is monotonically non-decreasing in parameter C.) Further, the sampling stage lasts for f(N) =
N +N2(m− 1) rounds. So the regret bound in the theorem follows from that in Lemma 6.3.
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7. Extensions: contextual bandits and auxiliary feedback
We now extend the black-box reduction result in two directions: contexts and auxiliary feedback.
Each agent comes with a signal (context), observable by both the agent and the algorithm, which
impacts the rewards received by this agent as well as the agent’s beliefs about these rewards.
Further, after the agent chooses an arm, the algorithm observes not only the agent’s reward but
also some auxiliary feedback. As discussed in Introduction and Related Work, each direction is
well-motivated in the context of BIC exploration, and is closely related to a prominent line of work
in the literature on multi-armed bandits.
7.1. Setting: BIC contextual bandit exploration with auxiliary feedback
In each round t, a new agent arrives, and the following happens:
• context xt ∈X is observed by both the algorithm and the agent,
• algorithm recommends action at ∈A and computes prediction φt (invisible to agents),
• reward rt(at)∈R and auxiliary feedback ft(at)∈F are observed by the algorithm.
The sets X ,A,F are fixed throughout, and called, resp., the context space, the action space, and
the feedback space. Here rt(·) and ft(·) are functions from the action space to, resp., R and F .
We assume an IID environment. Formally, the tuple (xt ∈ X ; rt : A→ R; ft : A→F) is chosen
independently from some fixed distribution Ψ that is not known to the agents or the algorithm.
There is a common prior on Ψ, denoted P, which is known to the algorithm and the agents.
Specifically, we will assume the following parametric structure. The context xt is an independent
draw from some fixed distribution DX over the context space. Let µa,x denote the expected reward
corresponding to context x and arm a. There is a single-parameter family D(µ) of reward distri-
butions, parameterized by the mean µ. The vector of expected rewards µ= (µa,x : a∈A,x∈X ) is
drawn according to a prior P0. Conditional on µ and the context x= xt, the reward rt(a) of every
given arm a= at is distributed according to D(µa,x). Similarly, there is a single-parameter family
of distributions Dfb(·) over the feedback space, so that conditional on µ and the context x= xt,
the feedback ft(a) for every given arm a= at is distributed according to Dfb(µa,x). In what follows,
we will sometimes write µ(a,x) instead of µa,x.
The incentive constraint is now conditioned on the context. To state it formally, the planner’s
recommendation in round t is denoted with Ixt , where x= xt is the context (recall that the recom-
mendation can depend on the observed context). As in Definition 3.1, let Et−1 be the event that
the agents have followed the algorithm’s recommendations up to (and not including) round t.
Definition 7.1 (Contextual BIC). A recommendation algorithm is Bayesian incentive-
compatible (BIC ) if
E[µa,x | Ixt = a,Et−1]≥max
a′∈A
E[µa′,x | Ixt = a,Et−1] ∀t∈ [T ], ∀x∈X , ∀a∈A.
Performance measures. Algorithm’s performance is primarily measured in terms of contextual
regret, defined as follows. A policy π : X →A is a mapping from contexts to actions. The number
of possible policies increases exponentially in the cardinality of the context space. Since in realistic
applications the context space tends to be huge, learning over the space of all possible policies
is usually intractable. A standard way to resolve this (following Langford and Zhang [2007]) is to
explicitly restrict the class of policies. Then the algorithm is given a set Π of policies, henceforth,
the policy set, so that the algorithm’s performance is compared to the best policy in Π. More
specifically, Bayesian contextual regret of algorithm A relative to the policy class Π in the first t
rounds is defined as
RA,Π(t) = E
µ∼P0
[
t · sup
π∈Π
E
x∈DX
[µ(π(x), x)]−E
A
[
t∑
s=1
µ(Ixs , x)
]]
. (7.1)
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As in Section 5, we will also provide performance guarantees in terms of average rewards and in
terms of the quality of predictions.
Discussion. In the line of work on contextual bandits with policy sets, a typical algorithm is in fact
a family of algorithms, parameterized by an oracle that solves a particular optimization problem
for a given policy class Π. The algorithm is then oblivious to how this oracle is implemented. This
is a powerful approach, essentially reducing contextual bandits to machine learning on a given data
set, so as to take advantage of the rich body of work on the latter. In particular, while the relevant
optimization problem is NP-hard for most policy classes studied in the literature, it is often solved
very efficiently in practice.
Thus, it is highly desirable to have a BIC contextual bandit algorithm which can work with
different oracles for different policy classes. However, an explicit design of such algorithm would
necessitate BIC implementations for particular oracles, which appears very tedious. A black-box
reduction such as ours circumvents this difficulty.
A note on notation.We would like to re-order the actions according to their prior mean rewards,
as we did before. However, we need to do it carefully, as this ordering is now context-specific. Let
µ0a,x =E[µa,x] be the prior mean reward of arm a given context x. Denote with σ(x, i)∈A the i-th
ranked arm for x according to the prior mean rewards:
µ0σ(x,1), x ≥ µ0σ(x,2), x ≥ . . .≥ µ0σ(x,m), x,
where m is the number of arms and ties are broken arbitrarily. The arm-rank of arm a given
context x is the i such that a= σ(x, i). We will use arm-ranks as an equivalent representation of
the action space: choosing arm-rank i corresponds to choosing action σ(x, i) for a given context x.
A rank-sample of arm-rank i is a tuple (x,a, r, f), where x is a context, a= σ(x, i) is an arm, and
r, f are, resp., the reward and auxiliary feedback received for choosing this arm for this context.
Unless the x is specified explicitly, it is drawn from distribution DX.
7.2. The black-box reduction and provable guarantees
Given an arbitrary algorithm A, the black-box reduction produces an algorithm AIC. It proceeds in
two stages: the sampling stage and the simulation stage, which extend the respective stages for BIC
bandit exploration. In particular, the sampling stage does not depend on the original algorithm A.
The main new idea is that the sampling stage considers arm-ranks instead of arms: it proceeds
in phases i=1,2, . . . , so that in each phase i it collects samples of arm-rank i, and the exploit arm
is (implicitly) the result of a contest between arm-ranks j < i. Essentially, this design side-steps
the dependence on contexts.
Each stage of the black-box reduction has two parameters, k,L ∈ N. While one can set these
parameters separately for each stage, for the sake of clarity we consider a slightly suboptimal
version of the reduction in which the parameters are the same for both stages. The pseudo-code is
given in Algorithm 6. The algorithm maintains the “current” dataset S and keeps adding various
rank-samples to this dataset. The “exploit arm” now depends on the current context, maximizing
the posterior mean reward given the current dataset S.
The black-box accesses the common prior via the following two oracles. First, given a context x,
rank all actions according to their prior mean rewards µ0a,x. Second, given a context x and a set S
of rank-samples, compute the action that maximizes the posterior mean, i.e., argmaxa∈AE[µa,x|S].
As before, we need to restrict the common prior P to guarantee incentive-compatibility. Our
assumption talks about posterior mean rewards conditional on several rank-samples. For a partic-
ular context x and arm-rank i, we are interested in the smallest difference, in terms of posterior
mean rewards, between the arm-rank i and any other arm. We state our assumption as follows:
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ALGORITHM 6: Black-box reduction with contexts, auxiliary feedback and predictions.
Parameters: k,L∈N; contextual bandit algorithm A
// Sampling stage: obtains k samples from each arm-rank
1 Initialize the dataset: S = ∅;
2 For each context x∈X : denote a∗x(S) = argmaxa∈AE[µa,x|S];
3 Recommend arm-rank 1 to the first k agents, add the rank-samples to S ;
for each phase i= 2 to m do
// each phase lasts KL rounds
4 From the set P of the next kL agents, pick a set Q of k agents uniformly at random;
5 For each agent p∈P −Q, recommend the “exploit arm” a∗xp(S);
6 For each agent in Q, recommend arm-rank i;
7 Add to S the rank-samples from all agents in Q
end
// Simulation stage (each phase lasts L rounds)
for each phase n=1,2, . . . do
8 Pick one agent p from the set P of the next L agents uniformly at random;
9 For agent p: send context xp to algorithm A, get back arm an and prediction φn;
10 recommend arm an to agent p;
11 For every agent t∈ P \ {p}: recommend the “exploit arm” a∗xt(S);
12 For every agent t∈ P in phase n≥ 2: record prediction φn−1;
13 Return the rank sample from agent p to algorithm A;
14 Add to S the rank-samples from all agents in this phase;
end
(P5) For a given arm-rank i∈ [m] and parameter k ∈N, let Λki be a random variable representing
ki ≥ k rank-samples of arm-rank i. Given context x, denote
Xk(i,j,x)= min
arms a 6=σ(x,i)
E
[
µσ(x,i),x−µa,x|Λk1 , . . . ,Λkj
]
.
There exist prior-dependent constants kP <∞ and τP , ρP > 0 such that
Pr
x∼DX
(
Xk(i,j,x)> τP
)≥ ρP
for any k≥ kP , any arm-rank i ∈ [m], and j ∈ {i− 1,m}.
The analysis is essentially the same as before. (For the sampling stage, the only difference is that
the whole analysis for any single agent is done conditional on her context x and uses arm-ranks
instead of arms.)
Property (P5) is used with j = i− 1 for the sampling stage, and with j =m for the simulation
stage. For each stage, the respective property is discovered naturally as the condition needed to
complete the proof.
Theorem 7.1 (BIC). Assume the common prior P satisfies Property (P5) with constants
(kP , τP , ρP). The black-box reduction is BIC (applied to any algorithm) if its parameters satisfy
k≥ kP and L≥LP , where LP is a finite prior-dependent constant. In particular, one can take
LP = 1+sup
x∈X
max
a,a′∈A
µ0a,x−µ0a′,x
τP · ρP .
The performance guarantees are similar to those in Theorem 5.2.
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Theorem 7.2 (Performance). Consider the black-box reduction with parameters k,L, applied to
some algorithm A. The sampling stage then completes in c = mLk + k rounds, where m is the
number of arms.
(a) Let ÛA(τ1, τ2) be the average Bayesian-expected reward of algorithm A in rounds [τ1, τ2].
Then
ÛAIC(c+1, c+ τ)≥ ÛA(1, ⌊τ/L⌋) for any duration τ .
(c) Let RA,Π(t) be the Bayesian contextual regret of algorithm A in the first t rounds, relative
to some policy class Π. Then:
RAIC,Π(t)≤L ·RA,Π (⌊t/L⌋)+ c · E
x∼DX
[
max
a∈A
µa,x−min
a∈A
µa,x
]
.
In particular, if µa,x ∈ [0,1] and the original algorithm A achieves asymptotically optimal Bayesian
contextual regret O(
√
t log |Π|), then so does AIC (assuming L is a constant).
(c) The prediction returned by algorithm AIC in each round t > c+L has the same distribution
as that returned by algorithm A in round ⌊(t− c)/L⌋.
8. Properties of the common prior
Property (P2), our main assumption on the common prior for the black-box reduction, is stated in
a rather abstract manner for the sake of generality (e.g., so as to allow correlated priors), and in
order to avoid some excessive technicalities. In this section we discuss some necessary or sufficient
conditions. First, we argue that conditioning on more samples can only help, i.e. that if a similar
property holds conditioning on less samples, it will still hold conditioning on more samples. This
is needed in the incentives analysis of the simulation stage, and to show the “almost necessity” for
two arms. Second, we exhibit some natural sufficient conditions if the prior is independent across
arms, and specifically prove Lemma 5.1.
8.1. Conditioning on more samples can only help
Fix arm i and vector a= (a1 , . . . , am)∈Nm, where m is the number of arms. Let Λa be a random
variable representing the first aj samples from each arm j. Denote
Xi,a = min
arms j 6= i
E [µi−µj |Λa] .
We are interested in the following property:
(P6) There exist prior-dependent constants τP , ρP > 0 such that Pr (Xi,a ≥ τP)≥ ρP .
We argue that Property (P6) stays true if we condition on more samples.
Lemma 8.1. Fix arm i and consider vectors a,b ∈ Nm such that aj ≤ bj for all arms j. If Prop-
erty (P6) holds for arm i and vector a, then it also holds for arm i and vector b.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that the property for this arm holds for a, but not
for b. Denote X =Xi,a and Y =Xi,b.
Then, in particular, we have Pr (Y > 1/ℓ2)< 1/ℓ2 for each ℓ ∈N. It follows that Pr (Y ≤ 0) = 1.
(To prove this, apply Borel-Cantelli Lemma with sets Sℓ = {Y > 1/ℓ2}, noting that
∑
ℓPr (Sℓ) is
finite and limsupℓSℓ = {Y > 0}.)
The samples in Λa are a subset of those for Λb, so σ(Λa)⊂ σ(Λb), and consequentlyX =E[Y |Λa].
Since Y ≤ 0 a.s., it follows that X ≤ 0 a.s. as well, contradicting our assumption. 
Therefore, Property (P2) implies Property (P3) with the same constant kP ; this is needed in
the incentives analysis of the simulation stage. Also, Property (P1) implies Property (P2) with the
same kP , so the latter property is (also) “almost necessary” for two arms, in the sense that it is
necessary for a strongly BIC algorithm (see Lemma 4.1).
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8.2. Sufficient conditions: Proof of Lemma 5.1
For each arm i, let Ski be a random variable that represents n samples of arm i, and let Y
k
i =E[µi|Ski ]
be the posterior mean reward of this arm conditional on this random variable.
Since the prior is independent across arms, Eq. 5.1 in Property (P2) can be simplified as follows:
Pr
(
µ0i −max
{
Y k1 , . . . , Y
k
i−1; µ
0
i+1
}≥ τP)≥ ρP ∀k > kP , i ∈A. (8.1)
Fix some τP such that 0 < τP < minj∈A(µ
0
j − µ0j+1). Note that the right-hand side is strictly
positive because the prior mean rewards are all distinct (condition (iii) in the lemma).
Since (µi : i ∈ A) are mutually independent, and for fixed k each Ski , i ∈ A is independent of
everything else conditional on µi, we have that (Y
k
i : i ∈A) are mutually independent. Thus, one
can rewrite Eq. 8.1 as follows:∏
j<i
Pr
(
Y kj ≤ µ0i − τP
)≥ ρP ∀k > kP , i∈A.
Therefore it suffices to prove that τP as fixed above, and some prior-dependent constant kP , for
any two arms j < i we have:
Pr
(
Y kj ≤ µ0i − τP
)≥ q > 0 ∀k > kP . (8.2)
where q is some prior-dependent constant. Observe that event {Y kj ≤ µ0i − τP} is implied by the
event {Y kj − µj ≤ ǫ} ∩ {µj ≤ µ0i − τP − ǫ}, where ǫ > 0 is a prior-dependent constant to be fixed
later. Invoking also the union bound we get:
Pr
(
Y kj ≤ µ0i − τP
)≥Pr ((Y kj −µj ≤ ǫ)∩ (µj ≤ µ0i − τP − ǫ))
≥Pr (µj ≤ µ0i − τP − ǫ)−Pr(Y kj −µj > ǫ) . (8.3)
By the full support assumption (condition (ii) in the lemma), the first summand in (8.3) is bounded
from below by some constant ρ > 0 when µ0i − τP − ǫ > b. The latter is achieved when τP , ǫ are
sufficiently small (because µ0i > a, also by the full support assumption). Fix such τP , ǫ from here
on.
It suffices to bound the second summand in (8.3) from above by ρ/2. This follows by a convergence
property (P7) which we articulate below. By this property, there exists a prior-dependent constant
k∗ such that Pr
(
Y kj −µj > ǫ
)≤ ρ/2 for any k > k∗. Thus, we have proved Eq. 8.2 for kP = k∗ and
q= ρ/2. This completes the proof of the lemma.
It remains to state and prove the convergence property used above.
(P7) For each arm i, Y ki converges to µi in probability as k→∞. That is,
∀i∈A ∀ǫ, δ > 0 ∃k∗(ǫ, δ)<∞ ∀k≥ k∗(ǫ, δ) Pr(∣∣Y ki −µi∣∣> ǫ)≤ δ.
This property follows from the convergence theorem in Doob [1949], because the realized rewards
are bounded (condition (iv) in the lemma). For a more clear exposition of the aforementioned the-
orem, see e.g., Theorem 1 in Ghosal [1996]. There the sufficient condition is that the parameterized
reward distribution Di(µi) of each arm i is pointwise dominated by an integrable random variable;
the latter is satisfied if the realized rewards are bounded.
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9. Conclusions and open questions
We have resolved the asymptotic regret rates achievable with incentive compatible exploration for
a constant number of actions, as outlined in the Introduction. We provided an algorithm for BIC
bandit exploration with asymptotically optimal regret (for a constant number of actions), and a
general “black-box” reduction from arbitrary bandit algorithms to BIC ones that works in a very
general explore-exploit setting and increases the regret by at most a constant multiplicative factor.
This paper sets the stage for future work in several directions. First, the most immediate technical
questions left open by our work is whether one can achieve Bayesian regret with constants that
do not depend on the prior (for a fixed m, the number of actions), and with only a polynomial
dependence on m. Second, one would like to handle bandit problems with a large number of actions
and a known structure on the action set.14 This would require handling agents’ priors with complex
correlations across actions, which do not necessarily satisfy the properties assumed in this paper.
On the other hand, algorithms for such problems typically explore only a sparse subset of the arms,
so perhaps the assumptions on the prior could be relaxed. Third, the mechanism design setup could
be generalized to incorporate constraints on how much information about the previous rounds must
be revealed to the agents. Such constraints, arising for practical reasons in the Internet economy
and for legal reasons in medical decisions, typically work against the information asymmetry, and
hence make the planner’s problem more difficult. Fourth, while our detail-free result does not
require the algorithm to have full knowledge of the priors, ideally the planner would like to start
with little or no knowledge of the priors, and elicit the necessary knowledge directly from the
agents. Then the submitted information becomes subject to agent’s incentives, along with the
agent’s choice of action. Finally, it would be tantalizing to bring the theory of BIC exploration
closer to the design of large-scale medical trials (see Section 1.4 for discussion). In particular, one
needs to account for heterogenous, risk-averse patients whose beliefs and risk preferences are largely
unknown (and probably need to be elicited), and whose decisions may deviate from the standard
economic assumptions.
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Appendix A: A simpler detail-free algorithm for two arms
The detail-free algorithm becomes substantially simpler for the special case of two arms. For the
sake of clarity, we provide a standalone exposition. The sampling stage is similar to Algorithm 1,
except that the exploit arm is chosen using the sample average reward of arm 1 instead of its
posterior mean reward, and picking arm 2 as the exploit arm only if it appears better by a sufficient
margin. The racing stage is a simple “race” between the two arms: it alternates the two arms until
one of them can be eliminated with high confidence, regardless of the prior, and uses the remaining
arm from then on.
Below we provide the algorithm and analysis for each stage separately. The corresponding lemmas
can be used to derive Theorem 6.1 for two arms, essentially same way as in Section 6.4.
Compared to the general case of m > 2 arms, an additional provable guarantee is that even
computing the threshold NP exactly does not require much information: it only requires knowing
the prior mean rewards of both arms, and evaluating the CDFs for µ1 and µ1−µ2 at a single point
each.
A.1. The sampling stage for two arms
The initial sampling algorithm is similar in structure to that in Section 4, but chooses the “exploit”
arm a∗ in a different way (after several samples of arm 1 are drawn). Previously, a∗ was the arm
with the highest posterior mean given the collected samples, whereas now the selection of a∗ is
based only on the sample average µˆ1 of the previously drawn samples of arm 1.
We use µˆ1 instead of the posterior mean of arm 1, and compare it against the prior mean µ
0
2.
(Note that µ02 is also the posterior mean of arm 2, because the prior is independent across arms.)
We still need E[µi−µj |a∗ = i] to be positive for all arms i, j, even though µˆ1 is only an imprecise
estimate of the posterior mean of µ1. For this reason, we pick a
∗ = 2 only if µ02 exceeds µˆ1 by a
sufficient margin. Once a∗ is selected, it is recommended in all of the remaining rounds, except for
a few rounds chosen u.a.r. in which arm 2 is recommended. See Algorithm 7 for the details.
ALGORITHM 7: The sampling stage: samples both arms k times.
Parameters: k,L∈N and C ∈ (0,1).
1 Let µˆ1 be the sample average of the resp. rewards;
2 if µˆ1 ≤ µ02−C then a∗ = 2 else a∗ = 1;
3 From the set P of the next L · k agents, pick a set Q of k agents uniformly at random;
4 Every agent p∈P −Q is recommended arm a∗;
5 Every agent p∈Q is recommended arm 2
We prove that the algorithm is BIC as long as C ≈ 2
3
µ02, and parameters k
∗,L are larger than
some prior-dependent thresholds. We write out these thresholds explicitly, parameterizing them by
the ratio λ=C/µ02.
Lemma A.1. Consider BIC bandit exploration with two arms. Algorithm
DetailFreeSampleBIC(k) with parameters (C,k∗,L) completes in Lk+max(k, k∗) rounds. The
algorithm is BIC if Property (P4) holds and µ02 > 0, and the parameters satisfy
λ,C/µ02 ∈ (0, 23),
k∗ ≥ 2 (λ ·µ02)−2 log 4β(λ) , (A.1)
L≥ 1+ 8
β(λ)
(
µ01−µ02
)
,
where β(λ) = λ ·µ02 ·Pr
(
µ1/µ
0
2≤ 1− 3λ2
)
.
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Proof. Let Z = µ2 − µ1. Consider an agent p > k. As in the proof of Lemma 4.2 it suffices to
show that E[Z|Ip =2] Pr (Ip = 2)≥ 0.
Denote E1 = {µ1 ≤ µ02−C}. As in the proof of Lemma 4.2,
E[Z|Ip = 2]Pr (Ip = 2)=E[Z|E1]Pr (E1) ·
(
1− 1
L
)
+E[Z] · 1
L
.
Thus for the algorithm to be incentive compatible we need to pick L:
L≥ 1+ µ
0
1−µ02
E[Z|E1]Pr (E1) . (A.2)
It remains to lower-bound the quantity E[Z|E1] Pr (E1). Since the means µi are independent,
E[Z|E1]Pr (E1) =E[µ02−µ1|µ02− µˆ1 ≥C] Pr
(
µ02− µˆ1 ≥C
)
.
Denote X = µ02 − µ1 and xˆk = µ02 − µk1 . Observe that xˆk is the sample average of k i.i.d. samples
from some distribution with mean X. Then the quantity that we want to lower bound is:
E[Z|E1] Pr (E1) =E[X|xˆk ≥C] Pr (xˆk ≥C) . (A.3)
We will use Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound to relate the right-hand side with quantities that are directly
related to the prior distribution P. More precisely, we use a corollary: Lemma A.4, which we state
and prove in Appendix A.3.
If we apply Lemma A.4 with C = λ ·µ02 and ζ = κ= 12 , then for k≥ 2(λ ·µ02)−2 log 4β(λ) the right-
hand side of Eq. A.3 is at least 1
8
β(λ). Therefore, E[Z|E1] Pr (E1)≥ 18β(λ). Plugging this back into
Eq. A.2, it follows that the conditions (A.1) suffice to guarantee BIC. 
A.2. The racing stage for two arms
The racing phase alternates both arms until one of them can be eliminated with high confidence.
Specifically, we divide time in phases of two rounds each, in each phase select each arm once, and
after each phase check whether |µˆn1 − µˆn2 |, is larger than some threshold, where µˆni is the sample
average of arm i at the beginning of phase n. If that happens then the arm with the higher sample
average “wins the race”, and we only pull this arm from then on. The threshold needs to be
sufficiently large to ensure that the “winner” is indeed the best arm with very high probability,
regardless of the prior. The pseudocode is in Algorithm 8.
ALGORITHM 8: BIC race for two arms.
Input : parameters k ∈N and θ≥ 1; time horizon T .
Input : k samples of each arm i, denoted r1i , . . . , r
k
i .
1 Let µˆki =
1
k
∑k
t=1 r
t
i be the sample average for each arm i;
2 Split remainder into consecutive phases of two rounds each, starting from phase n= k;
while |µˆn1 − µˆn2 | ≤
√
log(Tθ)
n
do
3 The next two agents are recommended both arms sequentially;
4 Let rni be the reward of each arm i= 1,2 in this phase, and µˆ
n+1
i =
1
n+1
∑n
t=1 r
t
i ;
5 n= n+1;
end
6 For all remaining agents recommend a∗ =maxa∈{1,2} µˆ
n
a
To guarantee BIC, we use two parameters: the number of samples k collected in the sampling
stage, and parameter θ inside the decision threshold. The k should be large high enough so that
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when an agent sees a recommendation for arm 2 in the racing stage there is a significant probability
that it is due to the fact that arm 2 has “won the race” rather than to exploration. The θ should
be large enough so that the arm that has “won the race” would be much more appealing than the
losing arm according to the agents’ posteriors.
Lemma A.2 (BIC). Assume two arms. Fix an absolute constant τ ∈ (0,1) and let θτ =
4
τ
/Pr (µ2−µ1 ≥ τ). Algorithm 8 is BIC if Property (P4) holds, and the parameters satisfy θ ≥ θτ
and k≥ θ2τ logT .
The regret bound does not depend on the parameters; it is obtained via standard techniques.
Lemma A.3 (Regret). Algorithm 8 with any parameters k ∈N and θ≥ 1 achieves ex-post regret
R(T )≤ 8 log(Tθ)|µ1−µ2| . (A.4)
Denoting ∆ = |µ1 − µ2| and letting n∗ be the duration of the initial sampling stage, the ex-post
regret for each round t of the entire algorithm (both stages) is
R(t)≤min
(
n∗∆+
8 log(Tθ)
∆
, t∆
)
≤min
(
2n∗,
√
8t log(Tθ)
)
. (A.5)
In the remainder of this section we prove Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2. Denote zˆn = µˆ
n
2 − µˆn1 and
let cn=
√
log(Tθ)
n
be the decision threshold for each phase n≥ k in Algorithm 8. For ease of notation
we will assume that even after the elimination at every iteration a sample of the eliminated arm is
also drawn, but simply not revealed to the agent. Let Z = µ2−µ1. According to Chernoff-Hoeffding
Bound, the following event happens with high probability:
C = {∀n≥ k : |Z − zˆn|< cn} . (A.6)
We make this precise in the following claim:
Claim A.1. Pr (¬C|Z)≤ 1
Tθ
.
Proof. By Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound and the union bound, for any Z, we have:
Pr (¬C|Z)≤
∑
n≥n∗
Pr (|Z − zˆn| ≥ cn)≤
∑
n≥n∗
e−2n·c
2
n ≤ T · e−2 log(Tθ)≤ 1
Tθ
.

Generally we will view ¬C as a “bad event”, show that the expected “loss” from this event is
negligible, and then assume that the “good event” C holds.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Let n∗ = θ2τ logT . Fix phase n≥ n∗, and some agent p in this phase. We
will show that E[Z|Ip = 2] Pr (Ip =2)≥ 0.
By Claim A.1, we have Pr (¬C|Z)≤ 1
Tθ
≤ 1/θτ . Therefore, since Z ≥−1, we can write:
E[Z|Ip =2]Pr (Ip = 2)= E[Z|Ip = 2,C]Pr (Ip = 2,C)+E[Z|Ip = 2,¬C]Pr (Ip = 2,¬C)
≥ E[Z|Ip = 2,C]Pr (Ip = 2,C)− θ−1τ .
Now we will upper bound the first term. We will split the first integral into cases for the value of
Z. Observe that by the definition of cn we have cn∗ ≤ θ−1τ . Hence, conditional on C, if Z ≥ τ ≥ 2cn∗ ,
then we have definitely stopped and eliminated arm 1 at phase n= k≥ n∗, since zˆn >Z− cn ≥ cn.
Moreover, if Z ≤−2cn, then by similar reasoning, we must have already eliminated arm 2, since
zˆn < cn. Thus in that case event Ip = 2 cannot occur. Moreover, if we ignore the case when Z ∈ [0, τ),
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then the integral can only decrease, since the integrand is non-negative. Since we want to lower
bound it, we will ignore this region. Hence:
E[Z|Ip = 2,C]Pr (Ip = 2,C)≥ τ Pr (C,Z ≥ τ)− 2 · cnPr(C,−2cn≤Z ≤ 0)
≥ τ Pr (C,Z ≥ τ)− 2 · cn
≥ τ Pr (C,Z ≥ τ)− τ ·Pr (Z ≥ τ)
2
Using Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound, we can lower-bound the probability in the first summand of the
above:
Pr (C,Z ≥ τ) = Pr (C|Z ≥ τ)Pr (Z ≥ τ)≥
(
1−
∑
t≥n∗
e−2·c
2
n
)
·Pr (Z ≥ τ)
≥ (1− 1
T
) ·Pr (Z ≥ τ)≥ 3
4
Pr (Z ≥ τ) .
Combining all the above inequalities yields that E[Z|Ip = 2]Pr (Ip = 2)≥ 0. 
Proof of Lemma A.3. The “Chernoff event” C has probability at most 1− 1
T
by Claim A.1, so
the expected ex-post regret conditional on ¬C is at most 1. For the remainder of the analysis we
will assume that C holds.
Recall that ∆ = |µ1 − µ2|. Observe that ∆ ≤ |zˆn|+ cn. Therefore, for each phase n during the
main loop we have ∆≤ 2 · cn, so n≤ 4 log(Tθ)∆2 . Thus, the main loop must end by phase 4 log(Tθ)∆2 .
In each phase in the main loop, the algorithm collects regret ∆ per round. Event C guarantees
that the “winner” a∗ is the best arm when and if the condition in the main loop becomes false,
so no regret is accumulated after that. Hence, the total regret is R(T ) ≤ 8 log(Tθ)
∆
, as claimed in
Eq. A.4.
The corollary (A.5) is derived exactly as the corresponding corollary in Lemma 6.3 
A.3. A Chernoff bound for the proof of Lemma A.1
In this section we state and prove a version of Chernoff bound used in the proof of Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.4. Let X ≥ 1 be a random variable. Let x1, . . . , xk ∈ [0,1] be i.i.d. random variables with
E[xi|X] =X. Let xˆk = 1k
∑k
t=1 xt. Then for any C,ζ,κ ∈ (0,1), if
k≥ − log (κ · (1− ζ) ·C ·Pr (X ≥ (1+ ζ)C))
2ζ2 ·C2 ,
then:
E[X|xˆk ≥C] ·Pr (xˆk ≥C)≥ (1− ζ) ·C · (1−κ−κ(1− ζ)) ·Pr (X ≥ (1+ ζ)C) .
We first prove the following Lemma.
Lemma A.5. Let x1, . . . , xk be i.i.d. random variables with E[xi|X] =X, and X ≥ −1. Let xˆk =
1
n
∑k
t=1 xt. Then for any C > 0, ǫ≤C and δ > 0:
E[X|xˆk ≥C] ·Pr (xˆk ≤C)≥ (C − ǫ) ·
(
1− e−2·δ2·k
)
·Pr (X ≥C + δ)− e−2·ǫ2·k (A.7)
Proof. Let EC−ǫ be the event X ≥ C − ǫ and EˆC be the event that xˆk ≥ C. By the Chernoff
bound observe that:
Pr
(
¬EC−ǫ, EˆC
)
≤Pr(|X − xˆk|> ǫ)≤ e−2·ǫ2·k (A.8)
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Moreover, again by Chernoff bounds and a simple factorization of the probability:
Pr
(
EC−ǫ, EˆC
)
≥ Pr
(
EC+δ, EˆC
)
=Pr
(
EˆC | EC+δ
)
·Pr (EC+δ)
= (1−Pr (xˆk <C | X ≥C + δ)) ·Pr (X ≥C + δ)
≥ (1−Pr (xˆk−X <δ | X ≥C + δ)) ·Pr (X ≥C + δ)
≥
(
1− e−2·δ2·k
)
·Pr (X ≥C + δ)
We can now break apart the conditional expectation in two cases and use the latter lower and
upper bounds on the probabilities of each case:
E[X|EˆC ]Pr
(
EˆC
)
= E[X|EC−ǫ, EˆC ]Pr
(
EC−ǫ, EˆC
)
+E[X|¬EC−ǫ, EˆC ] ·Pr
(
¬EC−ǫ, EˆC
)
≥ (C− ǫ)
(
1− e−2·δ2·k
)
·Pr (X ≥C + δ)− 1 · e−2·ǫ2·k
Where we also used that X ≥−1. This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma A.4. Now, if k ≥ − log(κ·(1−ζ)·C·Pr(X≥(1+ζ)C))
2ζ2·C2
and appplying the above Lemma
for δ= ǫ= ζ ·C we get:
E[X|EˆC ]Pr
(
EˆC
)
≥ (1− ζ)C(1−κ · (1− ζ))Pr(X ≥ (1+ ζ)C)−κ(1− ζ)CPr(X ≥ (1+ ζ)C)
≥ (1− ζ)C(1−κ−κ(1− ζ))Pr(X ≥ (1+ ζ)C)
Which concludes the proof of the Lemma. 
